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Donald R. Rothwell*

The Canadian-U.S. Northwest Passage
Dispute: A Reassessment

Introduction
Throughout much of this century Canada has sought to establish conclusively its sovereignty over the islands and waters which lie immediately north of continental Canada. The Canadian claim to the islands,
commonly known as the "Arctic Archipelago," is a vital link to Canada's
Arctic presence. Canadians regard themselves as much more Arctic-orientated than their United States neighbours. This is no doubt partly a
result of the large areas of continental Canada-spanning the Yukon,
North-West Territories and part of Quebec-which are sub-Arctic and
face the Arctic Ocean and North Pole. The Arctic Archipelago and the
fabled Northwest Passage are, however, also a significant part of the
Canadian national psyche. As such, any threat to Canada's sovereignty
over this region is considered just as significant a threat to the Canadian
national interest as would be a claim to the Canadian Rockies.' The first
positive evidence of a Canadian claim to these lands and waters came in
1909 in an assertion by Senator Poirier that Canada could draw a series
of straight lines from its eastern and western extremities due north to
the Pole. Since that time, various Canadians and successive Canadian
Governments have sought to positively assert variations of this claim,
the most recent expression of which was in 1986 when Canada pro*
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1. During 1991, Canadian public and media interest in the Arctic was once again
stirred when it was reported that United States and British submarines, which had
been operating in Arctic waters, surfaced near the North Pole. This resulted in a host
of newspaper comment about "threats to Canadian sovereignty" and Canada's
inability to effectively enforce its Arctic territorial and sovereignty claims. See Subs
Continue to Cruise the Pole, GLOBE & MAIL (ToRONTO), Aug. 1, 1991, at A5; Olivia Ward,
U.S. Runs Silent, Runs Deep in Arctic, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 11, 1991, at H2; M. Cernetig, 1-800 Call First Line of Defence, GLOBE & MAIL (TORONTO), Aug. 17, 1991, at A1,
A6. This, however, is not the first time such claims have been made. See Canadian
Practice in InternationalLan--ParliamentaryDeclarationsin 1986, 25 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L.
438 (1987). The former Soviet Union had a history of deploying submarines in the
Arctic. See W. Harriet Critchley, PolarDeployment of Soviet Submarines, 39 INT'LJ. 828865 (1984).
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claimed straight baselines around the islands of the Arctic Archipelago.
This enclosed the waters of the Northwest Passage so that they effectually became Canadian "internal waters."
Canada's efforts to conclusively establish its sovereignty over the
Northwest Passage, and to a lesser extent the Arctic Archipelago, have
not been readily accepted by the United States. This has not been
because the United States asserts a rival claim to the Arctic Archipelago,
but rather because of a belief that the waters of the Northwest Passage
should remain open to international navigation and not be subject to the
exclusive sovereignty of one state. This United States concern has
intensified since the 1960s because of technological developments that
have improved shipping and navigation through the ice-bound polar
waters. These advancements make the Northwest Passage a potential
commercial shipping route from Alaska to the East Coast of the United
States. Additionally, creeping coastal state jurisdiction has allowed littoral states to exercise more extensive sovereignty and jurisdiction over
navigation by foreign shipping within their territorial seas and internal
waters. The United States continued refusal to recognize absolute
Canadian sovereignty over the Northwest Passage has made this dispute
one of the most significant bilateral legal issues in the Canadian-United
States relationship.
Recently, developments have occurred which could pose renewed
threats to Canada's Arctic sovereignty. All of the Arctic nations, including Canada and the United States, are engaged in negotiations towards
the formation of a new environmental regime for the Arctic. The initiative for these negotiations is the worldwide concern over environmental
degradation and the emerging recognition of the importance of both
the north and south polar regions to the world environment and its climate. In 1991 the Arctic states took the first steps towards the creation
of a more comprehensive environmental regime with the signing of an
Agreement at Rovaniemi, Finland.2 This first truly northern multilateral
agreement amongst the Arctic states raises the question as to whether an
"Antarctic type" regime may eventually come into being in the Arctic.
The Antarctic Treaty, which in 1991 celebrated its thirtieth year
since entry into force, has proved a successful basis for the management
of the Antarctic continent and surrounding Southern Ocean. In particular, the Treaty, which in its original form had no particular emphasis on
environmental protection, has been used to develop the Antarctic
Treaty System, under which various environmental instruments have
been adopted. The most significant of these instruments is the 1991
Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty,
which effectively prohibits mining activities in Antarctica and implements for the first time an environmental impact assessment mechanism
2. See Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, June 14, 1991, Can.-Den.-Fin.Ice.-Nor.-Swed.-U.S.S.R.-U.S., 30 I.L.M. 1624 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Rovaniemi
Agreement]; Rudy Platiel, Canada to Join Eight-Nation Arctic Protection Body, GLOBE &
MAIL (TORONTO), June 10, 1991, at A8.
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for all Treaty regulated activities in Antarctica. One major reason for
the success of the Treaty is that it removed any question of sovereignty
for the life of the Treaty. Given that at the time of its implementation
there were seven territorial claims in Antarctica which had not been recognized by other members of the international community, including
the United States and the former Soviet Union, the "resolution" of the
sovereignty issue for the duration of the Treaty was a major
achievement.
The Antarctic example and the growing concern about environmental issues in the Arctic have raised the issue of whether Canada's efforts
to solidify its Arctic claim will be overtaken by a push to "internationalize" the Arctic. There have already been a large number of international fora at which the development of specific international regimes to
cope with Arctic issues have been discussed. Pollution control, management of wildlife, native rights, and the law of the sea are examples of the
3
issues subjected to multilateral discussion amongst Arctic rim nations.
The larger issue of whether a true international regime should be created has until now been avoided. Nevertheless, some commentators
suggest that the time has now arrived to seriously consider the possibility of a comprehensive Arctic regime. In a provocative 1988 editorial in
the journal, Arctic, Gordon Hodgson asked: "Are the Arctic islands
north of Canada owned by Canada? Yes, but since the islands are
largely unpopulated, why not have an Antarctic-type treaty in the North,
with reasonable and shared access for everyone in a peaceful sort of
'4
way?"
The suggestion brought an angry response from readers who
argued that there was no comparison between the two polar areas and
that it was inappropriate to suggest that a Treaty such as the Antarctic
Treaty could be successfully negotiated and implemented in the Arctic. 5
However, should such a suggestion be completely dismissed out of
hand? While there are substantial geographic differences between the
two polar regions, from political and legal perspectives they do have
some common characteristics. One of these is that sovereignty remains
an issue in both regions. However, whereas in the Arctic sovereignty
disputes continue to exist over territory and maritime boundaries, in
Antarctica such disputes have been successfully resolved by Article IV of
the Antarctic Treaty.
This article will focus on the question of Canada's sovereignty over
the waters of the Northwest Passage. As there is currently no dispute
over Canada's ownership and title to the islands of the Canadian Arctic
3. This question has also raised much academic debate. See BarnabyJ. Feder, A
Legal Regime for the Arctic, 6 ECOLOGY L.Q. 785 (1978); ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: BUILDING REGIMES FOR NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 165-188 (1989); GAIL OSHERENKO & ORAN R. YOUNG, THE AGE OF THE
ARCTIC: HOT CONFLICTS AND COLD REALITIES (1989).
4. Gordon Hodgson, Editorial: Who Owns the Land?, 41:4 ARCTIC at iii (1988).

5. Letters to the Editor, 42 ARCTIC 183-84 (1989).
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Archipelago, it is the Northwest Passage and the conflicting views of
Canada and the United States which have been the focus of debate during the past twenty-five years. Accordingly, this Article attempts to find
a basis for resolving that dispute. First, the background to the current
debate will be considered, followed by a review of the legal arguments.
In particular, emphasis will be given to the question of whether the Passage is an international strait for the purposes of the law of the sea and,
if it is, what has been the effect of Canada's 1986 straight baselines proclamation. Consideration will then be given to the question of sovereignty in Antarctica and how Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty sought to
resolve sovereignty issues throughout the duration of the Treaty. Could
an Article IV-type solution to the dispute over the Northwest Passage be
adopted by Canada and the United States? If such a solution was
adopted, what existing law of the sea provisions could also be relied
upon? Would such a solution meet Canada's concerns? Would it guarantee access to the Passage by United States shipping? This Article considers these issues in an effort to determine whether an Antarctic
solution to this Arctic problem could open the door for further international cooperation in the Arctic and thereby further the development of
a more cohesive Arctic legal regime.
I.

Efforts to Solidify Canada's Arctic Sovereignty

A.

Canadian Sovereignty up to 1969

As is the case with most claims to sovereignty over polar areas, Canada's
sovereignty claim to the islands of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago is
based on traditional grounds. That is, a series of territorial claims and
legislative acts over a period of time which, when combined, are evidence of Canadian sovereignty as against the claims of other states. The
basis for much of the Canadian claim to North America lies in various
acts of discovery by English and French explorers as they travelled
across the northern part of the continent and sailed through arctic
waters. They range from Sebastian Cabot's initial voyage to the northern coast of Labrador in 1497 to McClure's first crossing of the Northwest Passage over both land and water in 1850-1854. While most of
these expeditions were voyages of discovery, not all were accompanied
by the raising of the sponsoring sovereign's flag. Nevertheless, as a
great majority of the expeditions were English, there was a substantial
basis for Britain's sovereignty claims to the land based upon discovery.
The Canadian claim also finds a substantial basis in various treaties.
In 1763, the Treaty of Paris ceded to Great Britain all of France's possessions in British North America with the exception of the islands of St.
Pierre and Miquelon. 6 The 1825 Boundary Treaty between Russia and
Great Britain is also important. It establishes the now Canadian-United
States boundary along the 141st meridian. The Treaty provides that at
6. Definitive Treaty of Peace, Feb. 10, 1763, Fr.-Gr. Brit.-Spain, 42 C.T.S. 279.
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the terminus of the land frontier between what is now Alaska and the
Yukon, the boundary extends as far as "the Frozen Ocean." 7 In the
negotiations between Canada and the United States over their maritime
boundary in the Beaufort Sea, Canada has partly relied upon the words
of this Treaty to assert a claim over Arctic waters due north of the land
boundary terminus. This reading is especially significant, because it
would also go to support a Canadian territorial and maritime claim due
8
north to the Pole.
Following Canadian Confederation in 1867, there was a desire to
ensure that the legal status of all Canadian territory was settled. In
1875, an Order-in-Council was passed requesting that Great Britain
transfer all the lands north of the Dominion to Canada. There was no
doubt that the Parliament at Westminster considered these lands to be
British possessions and that it was competent to transfer sovereignty
over them. Accordingly, an 1880 Order in Council provided for the
transfer to Canada of "all the British possessions on the American continent, not hitherto annexed to any colony." 9 This proclamation included
"all British territories and possessions in North America, not already
included within the Dominion of Canada, and all islands adjacent to any
of such territories or possessions ... with the exception of Newfoundland and its dependencies." 10 Canada also took steps independent of
Great Britain to complete its legal title over the Arctic lands. In 1869, it
purchased from the Hudson's Bay Company the area known as Rupert's
Land which, in conjunction with the region known as the North-Western
Territory, subsequently became the "Northwest Territory" which is the
largest of all the political units within the Canadian Confederation and
includes the islands of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago.' I
While this patchwork acquisition of sovereignty through the transfer of title from previous administering powers was a useful mechanism
for the young country, there was little indication of what Canada
believed the full extent of its claims to the north could actually be. This
7. Convention between Great Britain and Russia concerning the Limits of their
Respective Possessions on the North-West Coast of America and the Navigation of
the Pacific Ocean, Feb. 16, 1825, art. 3, 75 C.T.S. 95.
8. For a discussion of the interpretation of the Treaty and the impact it has had
on the delimitation of the Beaufort Sea maritime boundary, see Karin L. Lawson,
Delimiting Continental Shelf Boundaries in the Arctic: The United States-CanadaBeaufort Sea
Boundary, 22 VA.J. INT'L L. 221 (1981); DONALD R. ROTHWELL, MARITIME BOUNDARIES
OPTIONS FOR THE BEAUFORT SEA 25-40 (1988); Donald
M. McRae, Canadaand the Delimitation of MaritimeBoundaries, in CANADIAN OCEANS POLICY: NATIONAL STRATEGIES AND THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA 145, 148 (Donald McRae &
Gordon Munro eds., 1989).
9. Ivan L. Head, Canadian Claims to TerritorialSovereignty in the Arctic Regions, 9
McGILL LJ. 200, 212 (1963) (quoting C. Gaz, Oct. 9, 1880).
AND RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT:

10. Adjacent Territories Order, 1880 (U.K.) (formerly Order of Her Majesty in
Council admitting all British possessions and Territories in North America and
islands adjacent thereto into the Union, July 31, 1880); for a comment on this transfer, see Head, supra note 9.
11. WILLIAM H. MCCONNELL, COMMENTARY ON THE BRITISH NORTH AMERICA ACT
28 (1977).
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all changed in 1907 when Senator Pascal Poirier, in a speech to the
Canadian Senate, recommended that Canada make a declaration proclaiming possession of all the lands and islands lying between its northern coast and the Pole. As the basis for this assertion, Poirier argued:
in future partition, of northern lands, a country whose possession today
goes up to the Arctic regions ... has a right to all the lands that are to be
found in the waters between a line extending from its eastern extremity
north, and another line extending from the western extremity north. All
the lands between the two lines up to the north pole should
belong and
12
do belong to the country whose territory abuts up there.
Poirier thus became one of the first Canadians to advocate that the "sector" theory could be used by sovereign states adjacent to polar areas to
justify a claim from the limits of their land mass along sector lines which
met at the Pole. This attitude towards Canada's Arctic sovereignty was
apparently shared by the Canadian explorer Captain J.E. Bernier, who
took "formal possession" of the whole Arctic Archipelago on July 1,
1909 by unveiling and depositing a plaque on Melville Island. The
inscription on the plaque read: "This Memorial is erected today to commemorate the taking possession for the Dominion of Canada of the
whole Arctic Archipelago lying to the north of America from longitude
60°W. to 141°W. up to the latitude 90°N."' 3 Despite the Poirier speech
and Bernier's proclamation, however, there is no conclusive evidence of
Canadian support for a sector claim in the Arctic. The truth is, that
since the Poirier speech, legal academics have cast considerable doubt
over the validity of the sector theory, and public statements from Canadian officials have never adopted the wide approach towards Canada's
Arctic claims. 14 Nevertheless, the sector theory has provided a basis for
Canada's assertion of sovereignty over the Arctic and especially Arctic
waters, though it has rarely been relied upon as the sole justification for
the Canadian claim in modern times.' 5
Canada's equivocation over the sector theory did not result in an
abandonment of its claims to the Arctic. Rather, throughout the Twentieth Century there have been varying Ministerial statements concerning
Canada's territorial claims towards the islands in the Archipelago and
over the waters between the islands and the Northwest Passage itself.
While some of these statements are contradictory on the actual extent of
the Canadian claim, there is no dispute that Canada claimed title to the
12. Canada, Senate, Debates, 271 (Feb. 20, 1907).

13. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, Vol. 1, at 1730 (1909-10), reprinted in
Head, supra note 9, at 211.
14. See GUSTAV SMEDAL, ACQUISITION OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER POLAR AREAS 54-76
(C. Meyer trans., 1931); Head, supra note 9, at 202-2 10; DONAT PHARAND, CANADA'S
ARCTIC WATERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-88 (1988).
15. This is true despite the fact that numerous maps seem to indicate a "boundary" line running from the eastern and western extremities of the Canadian mainland
north to the pole.
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islands of the Archipelago. 16 In fact, one commentator noted that by
1947 the Canadian claim to the territory of the Canadian Arctic became
so uncontentious that ".... it could be assumed that Canada's title had
been perfected to most of the arctic islands."' 7 Nevertheless, partly
because of Canadian reliance upon the suspect sector theory plus the
international law of the sea concerning internal waters, territorial seas
and navigation through straits, the same cannot be said regarding the
apparent Canadian position with respect to the waters around the Archipelago or the Northwest Passage. The true status of these waters
remained in doubt.
B.

The 1969 Manhattan Voyage

In 1969, Canada faced an unexpected foreign policy crisis that seemed
to directly threaten its Arctic sovereignty. The catalyst for this crisis was
the voyage by the SS Manhattan from the Beaufort Sea through the
Northwest Passage to Davis Strait. The Manhattan, carrying a small
cargo of oil, was intentionally sent through the Passage by its owners to
demonstrate that an icebreaking bulk carrier was capable of year-round
sailings between Alaska and the East Coast of the United States. The
voyage was only the eleventh complete transit of the Northwest Passage,
and the first since the end of World War II by a non-government vessel. 18 While the purpose of the voyage was innocent enough, the trip
had great implications in Canada because the Manhattanpassed through
waters traditionally considered to be Canadian. Consequently, despite
the presence of a Canadian Government representative on board the
tanker during the passage and an accompanying Canadian Coast Guard
vessel, thej.A. Macdonald,19 the voyage created considerable public controversy in Canada. The controversy resulted primarily from the mediacreated perception that the United States had refused to consult Canada
over the voyage. Concern was also expressed over the potential maritime and environmental disaster which would occur if an oil tanker was
involved in an accident while in Arctic waters. This anxiety, combined
with the realization that Canada's legal position regarding the waters of
the Northwest Passage and the Canadian Arctic was inconclusive,
allowed the Manhattan's voyage through these waters to be portrayed as
a direct threat to Canadian sovereignty which required an immediate
16. See Head, supra note 9, at 201-210; Robert S. Reid, The CanadianClaim to Sovereignty over the Waters of the Arctic, 12 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 11I, 112-14 (1974); V. Kenneth
Johnston, Canada's Title to the Arctic Islands, 14 CAN. HIST. REV. 24 (1933). For a
review of Canadian perspectives on territorial sovereignty, see Gerald Goldstein, Per-

spectives canadiennes de droit internationalpublic et privi relatives d la mat?ise du territoire, 28
CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 29 (1990).

17. N. D. Bankes, Forty Years of Canadian Sovereignty Assertion in the Arctic, 1947-87,
40 ARCTIC 285, 287 (1987). This does not mean that sovereignty was never a "live"
issue in the Arctic. See Nancy Fogelson, The Tip of the Iceberg: The United States and
InternationalRivalry for the Arctic, 1900-25, 9 DIPL. HisT. 131 (1985).
18. For details of the voyage, see Thomas C. Pullen, What Price Canadian Sovereignty?, PROCEEDINGS, U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, Sept. 1987, at 66, 69-71.
19. Id. at 71.
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20
Canadian response.
The difficulty which Canada faced was that, apart from the proclamation of a three-mile territorial sea around the islands of the Canadian
Arctic Archipelago, 2 1 there had been no formal assertion of Canadian
sovereignty over all the Passage waters or those surrounding the Archipelago. 2 2 Consequently, apart from where Canadian waters overlapped
in the narrow McClure Strait, the Manhattan was passing through high
23
seas during its navigation of the Passage.

The Canadian Government's public response to the Manhattan voyage came in the way of a Parliamentary statement on Canadian policy
concerning sovereignty in the north. Prime Minister Trudeau assured
Canadians that Canada's claim to sovereignty over its northern lands
was unquestionable and void of competing claims. 24 He stated, with
respect to the waters between the islands of the Canadian Arctic
Archipelago:
The area to the north of Canada, including the islands and the waters
between the islands and areas beyond, are looked upon as our own, and
there is no doubt in the minds of this government, nor do I think was
there in25the minds of former governments of Canada, that this is national
terrain.
The Prime Minister went on to add: "It is also known that not all countries would accept the view that the waters between the islands of the
archipelago are internal waters over which Canada has full sovereignty.
The contrary view is indeed that Canada's sovereignty extends only to
'26
the territorial sea around each island."
The Government, however, refrained from taking any further action
which might be interpreted as a positive assertion of Canadian sovereignty. 2 7 Despite the then official Canadian position, the legal reality
with respect to the waters of the archipelago was that, apart from the
proclamation of a three-mile territorial sea, Canada had not asserted any
additional jurisdiction or sovereignty claim over the Archipelago's
waters. Consequently, the right of high seas navigation through the
Northwest Passage remained in place except in narrow stretches of
water subject to Canada's overlapping territorial sea.
20.

EDGAR J. DOSMAN,

THE NATIONAL INTEREST:

THE POLITICS OF NORTHERN

DEVELOPMENT 46-47 (1975).

21. Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, ch. 22, 1964-65 S.C. 153 (1964)
(Can.).
22. See Bankes, supra note 17, at 285-86 (distinction made between territorial
claims to the islands of the Arctic Archipelago and claims to waters within the Archipelago and navigation routes such as the Northwest Passage).
23. DONAT PHARAND, THE LAW OF THE SEA OF THE ARCTIC WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO CANADA 57

(1973).

24. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, Vol. 8, at 8720 (May 15, 1969).

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See generally PHARAND, supra note 23, at 55-57.
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C. The Response to the Manhattan Voyage
Following its successful 1969 voyage, the Manhattan's owners
announced that the ship would attempt a second voyage in 1970. A different route was to be used, though theJ. A. Macdonald would once again
accompany the tanker. 28 This second voyage further raised public fears
about the status of the Passage. Public pressure on the government to
reaffirm Canada's Arctic sovereignty and to ensure that future voyages
did not pose a threat to that sovereignty increased. 29 Although the
Manhattan voyages demonstrated that passage through Arctic waters by
oil tankers was possible, concerns were also raised about the potential
construction of a fleet of super ice-breakers which had the ability to keep
the Northwest Passage open all year, allowing United States corporations to continually ship oil from Alaska to the East coast of the United
States.3 0
The Canadian response in 1970 had three bases. First was the
implementation of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act,3 1 which
extended Canadian jurisdiction 100 nautical miles from the low-water
mark in order to enforce certain pollution standards on vessels using
Canada's arctic waters. The Act applied to proclaimed "arctic waters"
which extended 100 miles out into the Beaufort Sea and Arctic Ocean
along the coastlines of the Yukon and Northwest Territories, including
the islands of the Arctic Archipelago. 3 2 This extended jurisdiction was
intended to enforce pollution control regulations on all shipping passing through such arctic waters. Under the Act, standards could be prescribed for vessel construction, navigation, and operation. Failure to
comply with these standards would result in the prohibition of passage
by such vessels. 33 Given that enforcement of pollution standards by
coastal states upon foreign-flagged vessels had up until this time only
been accepted within internal waters and the territorial sea, asserting
such jurisdiction 100 miles offshore was a very extensive claim which
exceeded existing conventions and customary international law.
The second Canadian response was to extend the territorial sea
from three to twelve nautical miles.3 4 This action effectively gave Canada full sovereignty over all waters twelve miles offshore the Canadian
28. See generally PHARAND, supra note 23, at 48 and references thereat; see also John
Kirton & Don Munton, The Manhattan Voyages and Their Aftermath, in POLITICS OF THE
NORTHWEST PASSAGE

67, 84-85 (Franklyn Griffiths ed., 1987).

29. Maxwell Cohen, TheArctic and the NationalInterest, 26 INT'LJ. 52, 67-68 (1970).
30. Id.
31. Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, ch. 47, 1969-70 S.C. 653 (1970)
(Can.).
32. Id. Section 3(2) defines "arctic waters" as waters "adjacent to the mainland
and islands of the Canadian Arctic within the area enclosed by the sixtieth parallel of
the north latitude, the one hundred and forty-first meridian of longitude and a line
measured seaward from the nearest Canadian land a distance of one hundred nautical miles ......
33. See PHARAND, supra note 23, at 224-32; Reid, supra note 16, at 117-29.
34. Act to Amend the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, ch. 68, 1969-70 S.C.
1243 (1970) (Can.).
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coastline, including the Arctic islands. More importantly, the extension
of the territorial sea to twelve miles resulted in a great deal of the Northwest Passage becoming enclosed within Canadian territorial sea so that
any transit of the Passage would now see vessels coming more frequently under Canadian jurisdiction.
The final step taken by Canada was to withdraw its acceptance of
the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court ofJustice regarding matters dealing with Canada's Arctic jurisdiction.3 5 This move
ensured that no claim could be made against the new Canadian measures, especially the validity of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention
Act, before the Court unless Canada agreed to submit to the Court's
36
jurisdiction.
In justifying its action, Canada relied upon the growing concern for
ecological protection of the Arctic. The nation argued that because
international law had not at that time developed sufficient measures to
protect the area from the dangers of pollution, it was appropriate for
Canada to take unilateral action. Prime Minister Trudeau argued:
[W]e're saying somebody has to preserve this area for mankind until
international law develops. And we are prepared to help it develop by
taking steps on our own and eventually, if there is a conference of nations
concerned with the Arctic, we will of course be a very active member in
such a conference and try to establish an international regime. But, in the
37
meantime, we had to act now.
Mitchell Sharp, Canadian Minister for External Affairs, also noted the
"gap" which existed in international environmental law, and how the
Canadian action sought to overcome this deficiency:
We are determined to discharge our own responsibilities for the protection of our territory. We are equally determined to act as pioneers in
pushing back the frontiers of international law so that the laissez-faire
regime of the high seas will no longer prevent effective action to deal with
a pollution threat of such a magnitude that even the vast seas and oceans
of the world may not be able to absorb, dissolve or wash away the discharges deliberately or accidently poured into them. 38
But it should be noted that Canada did not seek to absolutely bar international navigation. Rather, the Canadian action would "make clear
that the Northwest Passage is to be opened for the passage of shipping
of all nations subject to the necessary conditions required to protect the
35. CanadianDeclaration Concerningthe Compulsory Jurisdictionof the InternationalCourt
ofJustice, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 598 (1970).
36. Mitchell Sharp, Canadian Minister for External Affairs, frankly admitted that
Canada was "not prepared to litigate with other states on vital issues concerning
which the law is either inadequate, non-existent or irrelevant to the kind of situation
Canada faces, as in the case of the Arctic." Canada, House of Commons, Debates, Vol.
6, at 5952 (Apr. 16, 1970).
37. Pierre E. Trudeau, CanadianPrime Minister's Remarks on the ProposedLegislation, 9
I.L.M. 600, 601 (1970).
38. Debates, supra note 36, at 5951.
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39
delicate ecological balance of the Canadian Arctic."
The Canadian response to the second voyage by the Manhattan was
not welcomed in the United States. The Department of State argued
that "[i]nternational law provides no basis for these proposed unilateral
extensions of jurisdictions on the sigh [sic] seas, and the USA can
neither accept nor acquiesce in the assertion of such jurisdiction."'40 It
was also asserted that "[t]he enactment and implementation of these
measures would affect the exercise by the USA and other countries of
the right to freedom of the seas in large areas of the high seas and would
adversely affect our efforts to reach international agreement on the use
of the seas."'4 1 The United States response also indicated that if Canada
had not withdrawn acceptance of the International Court of Justice's
compulsory jurisdiction, a legal challenge would have arisen before the
Court on this question. While Canada's attitude towards a Court challenge may have effectively halted a potential United States challenge, it
also contributed to lingering doubts over the legal validity of its
42
action.
Despite Canada's efforts in 1970 to more actively assert extensive
sovereignty and jurisdiction over the waters of the archipelago and surrounding islands, the legal validity of these claims remained uncertain.
The law of the sea was also in some flux at the time with the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea about to commence
its meetings in an effort to reach agreement on unresolved matters following the First and Second Conferences. These circumstances contributed to uncertainty over the true legal position of the Northwest Passage
waters, and acted as a catalyst for continuing Canadian-United States
43
tension.

D. The Post-ManhattanState of the Sovereignty Claim: 1971-1985
Following the voyage of the Manhattan and the events of 1970, Canada
continued to assert that the waters of the Arctic Archipelago and Northwest Passage were "Canadian." In a letter of December 17, 1973, the
39. Debates, supra note 36, at 5938 (statement by Jean Chretien).

40. J. A. Beesley & C. B. Bourne eds., CanadianPracticein InternationalLaw during
1970 as Reflected Mainly in Public Correspondenceand Statements of the Department of External
Affairs, 9 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 288 (1971).
41. Id. at 287-88.
42. For details on the development of Canada's response to the Manhattan, see

Reid, supra note 16, at 117-26. For another comment on the status of the Passage at
this time, see Walter G. Reinhard, International Law: Implications of the Opening of the
North-west Passage,74 DICK. L. REv. 678 (1970);J. A. Beesley, Rights and Responsibilities
of Arctic Coastal States: The Canadian View, 3J. MAR. L. & CoM. 1 (1971).
43. The relative positions of Canada and the United States on the law of the sea
were additionally complicated by the differing positions taken towards the four
Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea negotiated in 1958. The United States
ratified all four of the Conventions by 1961 while Canada, despite signing all of the
Conventions, only ratified one, the Convention on the Continental Shelf in 1970.
Canada and the United States also had differing agendas for the Third United

Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. See DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON,
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA

73-76 (1985).
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Bureau of Legal Affairs stated that, in addition to certain historic claims
over the waters of Hudson Bay, Canada also claimed the waters of the
Canadian Arctic Archipelago as "internal waters of Canada, on an historical basis, although they have not been declared as such in any treaty
or by any legislation. ' 44 This view of the Government was further confirmed in May 1975 when the Secretary of State for External Affairs
noted that the Arctic waters were considered to be Canadian "internal
waters." 45 Further, in a 1980 legal memorandum, the Department of
External Affairs stated: "Canada continues to maintain the position that
the Northwest Passage is not an international strait; that the waters making up the passage are internal; and that any navigation in the Passage
will be subject to Canadian control and regulation for safety and environmental purposes."' 46 Despite these statements, however, the legal
position with respect to Canada's actual assertion of sovereignty and
jurisdiction over these waters did not support such claims. The combined effect of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act and Canada's
extended territorial sea did not provide a basis for a claim that the
waters of the passage were internal. As noted above, some of the Passage waters were now enclosed by Canada's territorial sea, which
extended out from the islands in the archipelago. Patches of high seas,
however, still remained within which high seas freedoms of navigation
still existed, with the exception of the pollution provisions of the Arctic
Waters Pollution Prevention Act. Additionally, Canadian commentators
were skeptical over the possible validity of an historic claim to the Archipelago's waters. 4 7 While many more supported the view that the Northwest Passage was not an international strait, the position still remained
that until Canada had taken every step possible to positively assert its
sovereignty and jurisdiction over these Arctic waters, any Canadian
claim of sovereignty would be contestable.
This remained the position of one of Canada's leading experts on
the Arctic, Professor Donat Pharand, who continued to doubt the legality of the Canadian position with respect to the Archipelago's waters.
Pharand urged the Canadian government to consider proclaiming a
series of baselines around the outer limits of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. In contrast to the official Canadian position, Pharand argued
that the Northwest Passage was an area of water over which the right of
innocent passage still existed, and that foreign warships had a right of
transit through these waters. He concluded:
44. Canadian Practice in InternationalLaw during 1973 as Reflected Mainly in Public
Correspondenceand Statements of the Department of External Affairs, 12 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L.
272, 279 (comp. Edward G. Lee 1974).
45. Canada, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on External
Affairs and National Defense, No. 24, at 6 (22 May 1975).
46. Canadian Practice in InternationalLaw during 1980 as Reflected Mainly in Public
Correspondenceand Statements of the Department of External Affairs, 19 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L.
320, 322 (comp. L. H. Legault 1981).
47. See PHARAND,supra note 23, at 99-144; D. M. McRae, Arctic Waters and Canadian
Sovereignty, 38 INrr'LJ. 476, 480-82 (1983); Reid, supra note 16, at 133.
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[I]t would seem more urgent than ever for Canada to draw straight baselines around its Arctic archipelago. Only then would Canada be in a position to ensure that it could exercise the necessary control adequately to
marine environment, the local Inuit population, and its
protect its Arctic 48
national security.
E.

The 1985 PolarSea Voyage and Canadian Response

Controversy arose again over the status of the Northwest Passage when
in the summer of 1985 it was announced that the United States ice49
breaker Polar Sea would sail through the Passage from east to west.
The United States informed Canada of the planned voyage, but did not
seek official permission. Two Canadian Coast Guard captains accompanied the PolarSea as "invited observers," however no attempt was made
by either Canada or the United States to interpret this as a grant of official permission for the voyage. 50 Despite calls for Canada to issue a formal protest over the voyage, the Canadian Minister for External Affairs,
Joe Clark, stated that the voyage "does not compromise in any way the
sovereignty of Canada over our northern waters, or affect the quite legitimate differences of views that exist between Canada and the United
States on that question." 5 1 Thus, Canada's response to this voyage was
to again reassert its right of sovereignty over the waters of the passage.
This was, however, not a legal right which Canada was prepared to posi52
tively assert so as to prohibit navigation by foreign flagged vessels.
The Canadian media took a strongly nationalistic view of the proposed voyage and, as had occurred in 1969 and 1970 with the Manhattan, saw the Polar Sea as a direct threat to Canadian sovereignty. This
sentiment, combined with the apparent disregard by the United States
for Canadian sensitivities, provided the media with an opportunity to
condemn the voyage. In reference to the United States approach to
freedom of navigation through the Northeast Passage, at that time controlled by the USSR, one Canadian national newspaper noted that the
active assertion of freedom of navigation through the Northwest Passage, but not through the Northeast Passage, was a "predatory policy,
one based on respect for a rival superpower and contempt for a feckless
48. Donat Pharand, The Legal Regime of the Arctic: Some OutstandingIssues, 39 INT'LJ.
742, 797 (1984). This was the position Pharand had adopted for some time. See also
Donat Pharand, The Waters of the CanadianArctic Islands, 3 OrrAwA L. REV. 414, 432
(1969); Donat Pharand, Canada'sArctic Jurisdiction in InternationalLaw, 7 DALHOUSIE
LJ. 315, 330-32 (1983). For a further review of Canadian Arctic policy during this
time, see Hal Mills, Ocean Policy Making in the Canadian Arctic, in NATIONAL AND
REGIONAL INTERESTS IN THE NORTH: THIRD NATIONAL WORKSHOP ON PEOPLE,
RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT NORTH OF 60, at 491-527 (1984).
49. Pullen, supra note 18, at 71.

50. Bilateral Relations USA-Arctic Sovereignty, INT'L CAN. 1 (June/July 1985).
51. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, Vol. 4, at 6043, (June 20, 1985).
52. See Inuit Fear, Voyage of U.S. Icebreaker Harms Sovereignty, GLOBE & MAIL
(TORONTO), July 10, 1985, at 8; No Plan to Protest Against Voyage, GLOBE & MAIL
(TORONTO), Aug. 3, 1985, at 1.
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friend."
Canada's formal response to the PolarSea voyage came on August 1,
1985, when the government announced that it would launch an "intensive review" of Canadian Arctic sovereignty. 54 The review culminated
on 19 September with a comprehensive statement on Canadian Arctic
sovereignty to Parliament. In his speech to the House of Commons, Joe
Clark stated:
Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic is indivisible. It embraces land, sea
and ice. It extends without interruption to the seaward-facing coasts of
the Arctic islands. Those islands are joined, and not divided by the
waters between them. They are bridged for most of the year by ice. From
time immemorial Canada's Inuit people have used and occupied the ice as
they have used and occupied the land. The policy of the Government is
to maintain the national unity of the Canadian Arctic archipelago and preserve Canada's sovereignty over land, sea and ice undiminished and
undivided. 55

Clark then proceeded to give the most definitive statement to date on
Canadian policy over the waters of the Northwest Passage and the Arctic
Archipelago: "[t]he policy of the Government is to exercise full sovereignty in and on the waters of the Arctic Archipelago and this applies to
the airspace above as well. We will accept no substitute."'5 6 This statement eventually saw six major policy initiatives announced. They were:
1) the establishment of straight baselines around the Canadian Arctic
Archipelago, effective from 1 January 1986;
2) the adoption of new legislation to enforce Canadian Civil and Criminal laws in the offshore areas enclosed by the straight baselines;
3) talks with the United States on co-operation in Arctic waters on the
basis of full respect for Canadian sovereignty;
4) increased aircraft surveillance and Naval activity in the Eastern Arctic;
5) the withdrawal of Canada's reservation to the International Court of
Justice; and
6) the construction of a Polar Class 8 ice-breaker to operate in the
enclosed waters and a review of the other means available through
which effective control could be exercised over Canadian arctic
57
waters.
The Clark statement, for the first time, effectively removed all doubts
about Canada's intentions in the Arctic and fully clarified Canada's legal
position over the region. By the proclamation of straight baselines
around the Arctic Archipelago, Canada had in one swift action made all
the waters that fell within the baselines "internal waters" of Canada over
which it had complete sovereignty and jurisdiction. The measures which
53. Editorial: All in the Family, GLOBE & MAIL (ToRoNTO), Aug. 8, 1985, at 6.
54. Canada to Launch Sovereignty Review, GLOBE & MAIL (TORoNTO), Aug. 2, 1985,
at 1.
55. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, Vol. 5, at 6463 (Sept. 10, 1985).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 6464. This statement also initiated a review of other aspects of Canada's Arctic policies. See Gerald Graham, An Arctic Foreign Policy for Canada, INT'L
PERSP., Mar./Apr. 1987, at 11.
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accompanied the proclamation of the baselines were also designed to
ensure that the Canadian action was not hollow and that it would be
supported by positive evidence of Canadian sovereignty and jurisdiction
over the waters.
The United States responded with expressions of "regret" over the
Canadian decision to expand its Arctic sovereignty and jurisdiction and,
along with other states, formally objected in writing to the Canadian
action.5 8 Nevertheless, in an effort to resolve the differences of opinion
that existed between the two states, the United States indicated a willingness to engage in bilateral discussions over the status of the Northwest Passage waters.5 9 The discussions did in fact take place and
resulted in agreement on several issues, though not with respect to
Canadian Arctic sovereignty.
F. 1988 Arctic Cooperation Agreement
In January 1988, following two years of negotiations, Canada and the
United States entered into an "Arctic Cooperation Agreement." '60 The
Agreement sought to reaffirm the need for Canadian-United States
cooperation in the Arctic in order to advance "their shared interests in
Arctic development and security."' 6 1 It acknowledged the importance of
protecting the unique environment of the Arctic, the well-being of its
habitants, and the uniqueness of ice-covered maritime areas. Both
states also acknowledged their shared interests in safe and effective icebreaker navigation off their Arctic coasts and the need for increased
knowledge on how to protect the Arctic marine environment. To that
end, the Agreement specifically provided:
a)

that both states would facilitate and develop cooperative measures for
navigation by their icebreakers in their respective Arctic waters;
b) that in accordance with international law both states would take
advantage of their icebreaker navigation to share research information so as to advance their understanding of the marine environment;
and,
c) that navigation by United States icebreakers within waters claimed by
Canada 62
to be internal would be undertaken with the consent of
Canada.
58. Sovereignty-Arctic Region, INT'L CAN. 9 (Aug. and Sept. 1985); Ronald G.
Purver, Aspects of Sovereignty and Security in the Arctic, in CANADIAN OCEANS POLICY:
NATIONAL STRATEGIES AND THE NEw LAw OF THE SEA 165, 170 (Donald McRae &
Gordon Munro eds., 1989).

59. For a discussion of United States policy concerning the Polar Sea voyage, see
Ted L. McDorman, In the Wake of the Polar Sea: CanadianJurisdictionand the Northwest
Passage, 10 MARINE POL'Y 243, 252-53 (1986). For a further review of the Canadian

reaction to the voyage, see also Nicholas Hewson, Breaking the Ice: The Canadian-American Dispute over the Arctic's Northwest Passage, 26 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 337 (1988);
Roy A. Perrin, CrashingThrough the Ice: Legal Control of the Northwest Passageor Who Shall

be the "Emperor of the North," 13
60.
I.L.M.
61.
62.

TUL. MAR.

LJ. 139 (1988).

Agreement on Arctic Cooperation, Jan. 11, 1988, U.S.-Can., reprinted in 28
142 (1989) [hereinafter 1988 Arctic Cooperation Agreement].
1988 Arctic Cooperation Agreement, supra note 60, cl. 2.
1988 Arctic Cooperation Agreement, supra note 60, cl. 3.
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In addition, Clause 4 of the Agreement sought to ensure that the respective positions of both states concerning the law of the sea in the Passage
63
and in other maritime areas would not be affected by the Agreement.
The Agreement created a special bilateral regime on icebreakers
and their Arctic use, navigation, and impact upon the environment. It
was not intended to deal with all types of navigation, with the exception
of Clause 2, which states that navigation should not adversely affect the
environment or local inhabitants. The Agreement, therefore, did not
cover navigation through the Northwest Passage by vessels similar to the
Manhattan. That both parties specifically reserved their respective positions on other law of the sea issues affecting the region is a further indication that the Agreement was limited to icebreakers. Thus, by entering
into the Agreement, the United States is not viewed as making any concession towards Canada's claim of sovereignty over the Northwest Passage. 64 The Canadian position that the Passage is not an international
strait also remains intact. Therefore, while the Agreement could be
interpreted as a step towards cooperation on an issue-specific problem,
the instrument could not be seen as a reconciliation of the nations' conflicting views with respect to navigation through the Northwest Passage. 65 Canada and the United States, through Clause 4, in effect
acknowledged that only navigation by icebreakers was covered by the
Agreement, leaving unresolved the more substantial areas of disagreement between the nations over other aspects of navigation through the
Passage.
The operation of the 1988 Arctic Cooperation Agreement was put
to the test in October of that year. In September, the United States
Coast Guard Polar Star assisted two Canadian icebreakers in the early
stages of a transit of the Northwest Passage. Upon completion of this
task the Polar Star found that returning through the Beaufort Sea was
impossible and, with winter fast approaching its only option was to
transit the Northwest Passage as soon as practicable. 66 Consequently, in
accordance with the 1988 Agreement, the United States requested per63. Clause 4 of the 1988 Arctic Cooperation Agreement provides: "Nothing in
this Agreement of cooperative endeavor between Arctic neighbors and friends nor
any practice thereunder affects the respective positions of the Governments of the
United States and of Canada on the Law of the Sea in this or other maritime areas or
their respective positions regarding third parties." 1988 Arctic Cooperation Agreement, supra note 60.
64. Legally this may be the position, however, politically the Canadian Government saw the Agreement as a significant step "in emphasizing Canada's control over
our North." See Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs,Joe Clark, in
CanadianPracticein InternationalLaw-ParliamentaryDeclarationsin 1987-1988, 26 CAN.
Y.B. INT'L L. 335, 350 (1988).
65. For a review of the Agreement, see John Honderich, Canada-U.S.Agreement on
the Northwest Passage: Compromise or Cop-out?, 14:4 INFORMATION NORTH: NEWSLETIER
OF THE ARCTIC INSTITUTE OF NORTH AMERICA 1 (1988); Purver, supra note 58, at 170-

73. In regard to icebreaking operations in the Arctic, see Lawson W. Brigham, Arctic
Icebreakers: U.S., Canadian, and Soviet, 29:1 OCEANUS, Spring 1986, at 47.
66. B. McAllister, U.S. Breaks DiplomaticIce to Aid Ship, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 1988,
at Al.
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mission to send the icebreaker through the Northwest Passage. Officials
in the State Department, however, insisted that this action was not to be
interpreted as a recognition of Canadian sovereignty. 6 7 The formal
United States request also noted that:
Polar Star will operate in a manner consistent with the pollution control
standards and other standards of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention
Act and other relevant Canadian laws and regulations. Costs incurred as
a result of a discharge from the vessel, including containment, cleanup
and disposal costs incurred by the United States or Canada and any damage that is an actual result, will be the responsibility68of the United States
Government, in accordance with international law.
The Canadian Government consented to the PolarStar voyage, assigning
a Canadian Coast Guard icebreaker to accompany it during its transit of
the Northwest Passage and placing a Canadian officer on board during
the journey. 6 9 After diplomatic correspondence resolved these matters,
the voyage proceeded without incident.
H.

The Legal Status of the Northwest Passage

The above review has sought to provide some background to the position which Canada has taken with regard to its claims over the islands of
the Arctic Archipelago and the Northwest Passage. The United States
response to Canada's position has consistently been that the waters of
the Passage are part of an "international strait" through which the freedom of navigation prevails. In this regard the United States attitude
towards the exercise of the freedom of navigation remains consistent
with the approach it has taken in a number of international fora and in
bilateral discussions with many coastal states. 70 Despite being a significant coastal state, the United States attitude towards navigation has
essentially been that of a maritime nation, reflecting not only the importance of maritime commerce to the United States, but also the impor71
tance it attaches to guaranteed freedom of navigation for its navy.
These are the issues which form the basis of the disagreement.
Understanding the relative positions adopted by each side, however,
requires consideration of the legal status of the Northwest Passage.
67. Id. at Al. The U.S. request also suggested that the presence of a Canadian
scientist and Canadian Coast Guard officer on board during the voyage would be
welcomed, and that there would also be no objection if Canada chose to send an
icebreaker to accompany the PolarStar during the passage. See U.S. Note No. 425, Oct.
10, 1988, reprintedin 28 I.L.M. 144 (1989).
68. U.S. Note No. 425, supra note 67.
69. See Canadian Response to U.S. Note No. 425, Oct. 10, 1988, reprintedin 28 I.L.M.

145 (1989).
70. See David L. Larson, Innocent, Transit, and Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage, 18
& INT'L L. 411, 420-26 (1987).
71. SeeJohn W. Rolph, Freedom of Navigationand the Black Sea Bumping Incident How
"Innocent" Must Innocent Passage Be?, 135 MIL. L. REv. 137 (1992).
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Straits in International Law

Straits have increasingly attained significance in the law of the sea due to
the further extension of maritime zones from the low-water marks of
coastal states. The debate that has occurred over the legal status of
straits has also been dominated by the traditional concerns of the rights
of coastal states to exercise sovereignty over their territorial sea and the
rights of maritime states to exercise the freedom of navigation. 72
Because straits were seen as "choke points" through which international
shipping, by necessity, had to pass through, some argued that an exception to the rule of coastal state sovereignty over the territorial sea should
exist in certain cases. If an exception did not exist for straits, with the
extension of coastal state jurisdiction over the waters of the territorial
sea, many straits would become subject to the navigational regimes
imposed by the coastal state, possibly resulting in severe limitations on
international maritime commerce and navigation by all vessels. Accordingly, the concept of "innocent passage" through the territorial sea was
developed as a compromise to resolve this problem. Under this regime,
passage through a strait where there was no high seas corridor was to be
73
granted if it was "innocent."
1.

The Corfu Channel Case

Although the development of the right of innocent passage through the
territorial sea assisted navigation through international straits, some
uncertainty as to the exact scope of the right still existed. 74 It was under
these circumstances that in 1949 the International Court of Justice
decided the Corfu Channel case. 75 In this case, the Court was asked to
consider the extent of navigation rights by United Kingdom warships
through the North Corfu Channel, which was controlled by Albania and
over which Albanian territorial sea had been proclaimed. In its judgment, the Court upheld the right of innocent passage through straits
used for international navigation. The decisive criteria for the application of this right were that the strait connect two parts of the high seas,
and that the strait be used for international navigation. 7 6 The Court
had no difficulty in finding that the Corfu Channel met the geographical
requirement. There was more concern, however, over whether the functional requirement that the strait was being used for international navi72. For a discussion of the traditional freedom of navigation through the seas, see

Ruth Lapidoth, Freedom of Navigation-ItsLegal History and Its Normative Basis, 6J. MAR.
L. & COM. 259 (1974-75).

73. See FRANCIS NGANTCHA, THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE AND THE EVOLUTION
OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 38-43 (1990).

74. In some cases, specific treaties were negotiated to regulate navigation
through certain straits. See 2 ERIK BROEL, INTERNATIONAL STRAITS (1947) (discussing
the position of the Danish Straits, Strait of Gibraltar, Strait of Magellan and Turkish
Straits).
75. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4.
76. Id. at 28.
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gation was established. 7 7 To decide this question, the Court referred to
various statistics on the number of foreign flagged vessels that had
passed through the Channel in previous years. 78 The Court concluded
that the Channel provided a "useful route" for navigation and this was
sufficient to meet the functional requirement. As to whether this test of
usage depended on volume of traffic or importance of the strait for
international navigation, the Court responded that "the decisive criterion is rather its geographic situation as connecting two parts of the high
seas and the fact of its being used for international navigation."'79
2.

The 1958 Geneva Convention on the TerritorialSea and Contiguous Zone

The decision by the International Court of Justice in Corfu Channel
resulted in a much greater understanding of how the right of innocent
passage could apply to straits. Importantly, the judgment identified that
the right only applied in straits used for international navigation and
laid down criteria for determining such straits. 80 Despite the Court's
clarification of the law on navigation through straits, however, uncertainty still remained as to the extent of the right of innocent passage
through international straits. This became a matter for consideration at
the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea which resulted in
the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (1958
Geneva Convention). 8 1 Given that much of the 1958 Geneva Convention codified existing customary international law, it is not surprising
that the International Court's ruling in Corfu Channel concerning international straits was adopted.
The right of innocent passage through the territorial sea was recognized in Article 14. According to the provision, innocent passage was
defined as "navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose either
of traversing that sea without entering internal waters, or of proceeding
to internal waters, or of making for the high seas from internal
82
waters."
Innocent passage through the territorial sea of a coastal state could
77. Id. The Court noted that Albania denied that the Corfu Channel:
belongs to the class of international highways through which a right of passage exists, on the grounds that it is only of secondary importance and not
even a necessary route between two parts of the high seas, and that it is used
almost exclusively for local traffic to and from the ports of Corfu and
Saranda.
Id.
78. Id. at 29. It was noted that the British Navy regularly used the Channel for
more than eighty years.
79. Id. at 28.
80. For a further comment on this decision, see 1 DANIEL P. O'CONNELL, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 306-14 (Ivan A. Shearer ed., 1982).
81. Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 516
U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter 1958 Geneva Convention] (entered into force on 10 Sept.
1964).
82. Id. art. 14(2).
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only be prohibited where the passage was not innocent, 8 3 or if the
coastal state had temporarily suspended the right of innocent passage to
protect its own security. 84 Passage through an international strait, however, could not be suspended. Article 16(4) provided that "[t]here shall
be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through
straits which are used for international navigation between one part of
the high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a
foreign State."
Despite the considerable advances in the law of the sea that resulted
from the 1958 Geneva Convention, there remained many unresolved
issues concerning the right of innocent passage through straits. The
most significant problem was that it failed to adequately define the term
"international strait." While Article 16(4) provided a geographic
requirement that shipping pass to and from high seas or be en route to
the territorial sea of a foreign State, no explicit reference was made for a
functional requirement that a certain volume of shipping pass through
the strait.8 5 Consequently, customary international law on straits continued to develop beyond the basic provisions of the 1958 Geneva Convention. Thus, when the Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea convened in 1973, the agenda included the issue of passage
86
through straits.
3.

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) 87 is the most significant multilateral convention adopted on
the law of the sea. Not only did it codify many areas of the law of the
sea, but it also considerably developed certain areas of the international
law. Article 3 of UNCLOS recognized that coastal states could proclaim
a territorial sea of up to twelve nautical miles. Consequently, straits
through which there previously existed a high seas corridor were
enclosed by territorial sea. Rather than applying the right of innocent
passage through these newly enclosed waters, UNCLOS adopted
"transit passage" as a new navigation regime for shipping through inter83. Id. art. 14(4) (outlined what was required for passage to be innocent).
84. Id- art. 16(3).

85. See

CHRISTOs L. RoZAKIS

& PETRos N.

STAGOS, THE TURKISH STRAITS

64-67

(1987).
86. For a review of some of the problems which existed with the regime of passage through straits during that time, see O'CONNELL, supra note 80, at 317-27; Richard B. McNees, Freedom of Transit through InternationalStraits, 6 J. MAR. L. & COM. 175

(1974-1975).
87. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS]. The
Convention has yet to enter into force, but as ofJanuary 1993 the Convention had a
total of 52 instruments of ratification and two of accession, providing a total of 54 of
the required 60 state parties which must under Article 308 have ratified or acceded to
the Convention before it will enter into force. See 22 LAW OF THE SEA BULL. 1-2 (Jan.
1993).
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national straits.
UNCLOS devotes all of Part III to straits used for international navigation, recognizing four types of passage through straits. First, the normal freedoms of navigation, as prescribed in UNCLOS, still apply
through straits used for international navigation through which there
exists a high seas or exclusive economic zone corridor.8 9 Second, it also
does not affect already existing convention-based regimes that provide
for passage by shipping through specific international straits. 90 Third,
the newly created right of transit passage applies in straits used for
"international navigation" which connect one part of the high seas or
exclusive economic zone with another part of the high seas or exclusive
economic zone.9 1 In the fourth case, a non-suspendable right of innocent passage applies where a strait is formed by an island of a State bordering the strait and its mainland and there exists to seaward of the
island a route through the high seas or exclusive economic zone of similar convenience. 9 2 Article 38 of UNCLOS details the rights associated
with transit passage, providing that transit passage shall be unimpeded
in cases of "continuous and expeditious transit of the strait between one
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of
the high seas or an exclusive economic zone."'9 3 Nevetheless, as was the
case with the 1958 Geneva Convention, UNCLOS fails to define precisely to which straits "used for international navigation" the right of
94
transit passage applies.
B.

Is the Northwest Passage an International Strait?

The above discussion of the status of straits in international law demonstrates the progressive development of the law during the latter part of
this century. Much of the catalyst for this development has been the
recognition that straits used for international navigation are a special
category because of the role they play in international maritime traffic.
Moreover, with the expansion of the territorial sea regime to a twelve
nautical mile limit, many straits are now completely enclosed by territorial waters and are without high seas corridors through which international shipping can pass without coming under the jurisdiction of the
adjacent coastal state or states. The question now becomes whether it is
possible to apply the navigation regime of international straits to the
88. Said Mahmoudi, Customary InternationalLaw and Transit Passage, 20 OcEN DEv.
& INT'L L. 157, 165-66 (1989) (argues that the acceptance at the Third United

Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea of a 12 mile territorial sea was dependent
upon the development of the transit passage regime).
89. UNCLOS, supra note 87, art. 36.
90. UNCLOS, supra note 87, art. 35(c). Examples of this are the Bosphorus and
Dardanelles.
91.
92.
93.
94.

UNCLOS,
UNCLOS,
UNCLOS,
UNCLOS,

supra note
supra note
supra note
supra note

87,
87,
87,
87,

arts. 37 and 38.
arts. 38(1) and 45.
art. 38.
art. 37.
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Northwest Passage. This assessment, however, requires an understanding of the Passage's complexity from a navigational perspective.
L

The Geography of the Passage

As a shipping route, the Northwest Passage is in reality a series of connected straits passages. From the east, it allows shipping to pass from
the North Atlantic Ocean up Davis Strait between Canada and Greenland, through the Arctic Archipelago to the Beaufort Sea, and then to
the Chukchi Sea and the Bering Strait into the North Pacific. Given the
large number of islands that make up the Arctic Archipelago, there exist
many potential shipping routes from east to west and west to east. The
practical reality, however, is that because of the heavy ice found in these
polar waters, and the shallow draught that exists in some of the straits,
there are only a handful of viable combinations of straits and channels
which can be used to make the complete crossing.
According to Pharand, there are five possible routes, with some variations that can be used to navigate the Passage.9 5 They are as follows:
Route 1 From east to west runs through Davis Strait into Baffin Bay and
then west into Lancaster Sound, Barrow Strait, Viscount Melville Sound, Prince of Wales Strait and then Amundsen Gulf.
With Canada's present twelve mile territorial sea, high seas corridors only exist in Lancaster Sound, Viscount Melville Sound
and Amundsen Gulf on this route. Barrow Strait does have a
substantial high seas corridor through it, but islands lie across
the strait south of Bathurst Island so as to create a chain of
linking territorial sea across to Russell Island. Prince of Wales
Strait is the most narrow of all the straits which would be used
in this passage, and with an average width of 10 miles is
enclosed by territorial sea from Banks Island and Victoria
Island.
Route 2 This route, commonly known as the "Parry Channel," substitutes McClure Strait for Prince of Wales Strait as described in
Route 1. McClure Strait has a high sea corridor between the
territorial sea from islands to the north and Banks Island to the
south.
Route 3 This route follows the Parry Channel (Route 2) till Barrow
Strait where it heads south through Peel Sound, Franklin
Strait, Larsen Sound, Victoria Strait, Queen Maud Gulf, Dease
Strait, Coronation Gulf, Dolphin and Union Strait and finally
Amundsen Gulf. After leaving Barrow Strait, most of this
route is through Canadian territorial sea, with only Larsen
Sound, Victoria Strait and Amundsen Gulf having substantial
96
high sea corridors.
Route 4 This is a variation of Route 3 in which vessels leave Lancaster
Sound to pass to the east of Somerset Island through Prince
95. PHARAND, supra note 14, at 187-201.
96. A variation of this route is to pass on the east side of King William Island
instead of the west, passing through James Ross Strait, St. Roch Basin, Rae Strait,
Rasmussen Basin and Simpson Strait-the waters of which are all overlapped by
Canadian territorial sea.
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Regent Inlet and then use Bellot Strait to rejoin Route 3 in
Franklin Strait. Only Prince Regent Inlet has a substantial high
seas corridor through it.
Route 5 This route does not utilize Davis Strait and Lancaster Sound
when approaching from the east but rather approaches SomersetIsland through Hudson Strait, Foxe Basin, Fury and Hecla
Strait and then through the Gulf of Boothia to Bellot Strait
where it connects with Route 3. Only in Foxe Basin and the
Gulf of Boothia are there substantial areas of high sea.
These are the major navigation routes through the Canadian Arctic
Archipelago that represent the various options available for navigation
through the Northwest Passage. Not all of these routes though are suitable for all vessels due to limitations caused by water depth and shoals.
Of course, the polar conditions and presence of ice also impose severe
limitations upon shipping. Thus, even during the summer months a vessel may require some ice breaking capacity to successfully complete the
97
passage.
2. Legal questions regardingthe Passage
When considering whether the Northwest Passage is an international
strait through which a right of navigation exists, the first issue that arises
is whether it is possible to equate the Passage with a single strait. As
described above, the Northwest Passage is a series of connecting straits
which when combined offers a variety of navigation routes through the
Canadian Arctic Archipelago. This is unlike. the situations covered by
both customary international law and the conventions, which provide
only for a regime based on passage through an "international strait"
and not a series of straits. There is no evidence that much consideration
has even been given to this question in the past, though it should be
noted that UNCLOS does provide for a navigational regime within the
waters of an archipelagic state. 98 While there has been no suggestion
that this particular regime applies to the waters under consideration
here, 99 there has been some debate over whether for the purposes of
applying a regime of freedom of navigation through straits which connect areas of high seas or exclusive economic zones, the straits that
make up such a navigation route through an archipelago should be
looked at in isolation or as a whole.' 0 0 Irrespective of the approach
taken, the "straits" which make up the Northwest Passage are certainly
97. On the difficulties of navigation in the Passage, see Donat Pharand, The Northwest Passagein InternationalLaw, 17 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 99, 100-01 (1979).
98. See the regime of Archipelagic States adopted in Part IV of UNCLOS.
99. It was never intended that the provisions of Part IV of UNCLOS apply in the

case of offshore archipelagoes such as those of Canada and the United States
(Hawaii). See UNCLOS, supra note 87, art. 46.

100. See K. L. KOH,
18 (1982).

STRAITS IN INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

Cornell InternationalLaw Journal

Vol 26

"geographic straits" consistent with the interpretation of the term,' 0 '
and do indeed connect areas of high seas and exclusive economic
zones. 10 2 The Northwest Passage under either of these approaches
therefore meets the geographic requirement of an international strait as
found in the Corfu Channel case, the 1958 Geneva Convention and
UNCLOS.10 3
As to the second requirement, that the strait actually be used for
international navigation, there has been considerable debate over the
status of this requirement-how it is to be applied, and whether the criterion is fulfilled in the case of the Northwest Passage. Briiel, in his
major 1947 treatise on international straits, argued that the importance
of the strait to international sea commerce was the decisive factor. 0 4
The International Court of Justice, however, adopted a different
approach in the Corfu Channel case. The Court chose to emphasize the
geographic qualities of the strait, while making the amount of maritime
traffic which passed through the strait only a subsidiary consideration.
Nevertheless, the court referred to various figures on shipping movement through the strait, and seemed to imply that if any requisite standard existed, such criterion had been met in the case of the Cofu
Channel.10 5
Despite the Court's equivocal stance on this question, there has
been continuing emphasis since the decision upon the requirement that,
at the very least, the strait through which the right of passage is being
claimed be used for "international navigation."' 106 The question that
still remains, however, is what volume of usage for international navigation is required. Nandan and Anderson, both delegates at the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, take the view that
potential use is insufficient; there must be actual use, although it does
not have to be "regular or... reach any predetermined level."' 0 7 They
101. On the question of the geographic conception of a strait, see 1 ERIK BROEL,
INTERNATIONAL STRAITS 17-20 (1947); JOSE A. DE YTURRIAGA, STRAITS USED FOR
INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION: A SPANISH PERSPECTIVE 4-6 (1991).

102. If one views the Passage as a series of interconnecting straits which are so
substantially related so as to form one long strait, then clearly the Passage connects
the waters of the Beaufort Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean. If, on the other hand,
the straits are viewed in isolation, they connect isolated patches of high seas corridors, which in the cases of the Viscount Melville Sound, Amundsen Gulf, the Gulf of
Boothia, and Foxe Basin, are substantial bodies of water.
103. This is a conclusion which has also been reached by other commentators. See

J. Bruce

McKinnon, Arctic Baselines: A Litore Usque Ad Litus, 66 CAN. BAR REV. 790, 816
(1987); PHARAND, supra note 14, at 223-24. See also Donat Pharand, Sovereignty in the
Arctic: The International Legal Context, in SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY IN THE ARCTIC
145, 153-55 (EdgarJ. Dosman ed., 1989).
104. 1 BROEL, supra note 101, at 42.
105. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 28-29.
106. See KOH, supra note 100, at 19-22; DE YTURRIAGA, supra note 101, at 8-12; S. N.
Nandan & D. H. Anderson, Straits usedfor InternationalNavigation: A Commentaiy on Part
III of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, 60 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 159,
167-69 (1989).
107. Nandan & Anderson, supra note 106, at 169.
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make the point that efforts at the Conference to insert terms such as
"normally," "customarily," or "traditionally" into the text of "straits
used for international navigation" were all rejected, stressing that any
type of use may be relevant.' 0 8 Tommy Koh, President of the Conference from 1981 to 1982, agrees that potential use of a strait is not
enough and that actual use is necessary. 10 9 According to Koh, because
the UNCLOS provisions dealing with transit passage in international
straits adopt the same interpretation of straits as used in the 1958
Geneva Convention, both a geographic and functional requirement
must be met. Because the provisions do not provide a clear definition of
the functional requirement, he believes that the approach used in the
Corfu Channel case still applies. Interpreting the decision as one in which
the Court rejects the view that a certain volume of traffic is necessary,
Koh argues that what UNCLOS requires is evidence "that a strait is actually being used, the volume of such usage being irrelevant, for international navigation." 110
Pharand takes a different view of the functional requirement laid
down in the Corfu Channel case, consistently arguing that the Court
required not only that a strait have a history of usage for international
navigation, but also that the volume of the traffic was important."'
Thus, while admitting that the Court did not give an exact indication of
the degree of use necessary, 112 Pharand argues that, at the very least,
' 3
the strait must be a "useful route for international maritime traffic." 1
For the purposes of applying this test, Pharand suggests that:
The sufficiency of the use is determined mainly, but not exclusively, by
reference to two factors: the number of ships using the strait and the
number of flag states represented. Both of these figures should normally
reach the order of magnitude shown to exist in the Corfu Channel case.
There, the ships using the North Corfu Channel averaged 137 a month,
1 14
during a twenty-one-month period, and represented seven flag states.
Accordingly, the Northwest Passage would fail to be classified as a
"strait used for international navigation" because of the low number of
recorded transits. 115 However, is it possible that because of the presence of ice which makes it physically impossible for most conventional
shipping to use many of the straits in the Passage not only during the
winter but also the summer, that a special polar standard could be
applied in the case of straits such as the Northwest Passage? Pharand
108. Id. For a discussion of how this issue was dealt with at the Conference, see
also DE YTURRIAGA, supra note 101, at 3-4.
109. Tommy B. Koh, The TerritorialSea, Contiguous Zone, Straits and Archipelagoesunder
the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 29 MALAYA L. REv. 163, 178 (1987).
110. Id. at 180.
111. Donat Pharand, Canada's Sovereignty over the Newly Enclosed Arctic Waters, 25
CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 325, 337 (1987); PHARAND, supra note 14, at 224.
112. Pharand, supra note 97, at 106-07.
113. Id. at 107; PHARAND, supra note 14, at 224.
114. Pharand, supra note 97, at 107.
115. See PHARAND, supra note 14, at 202-14.
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concedes that allowances should be made in such cases, and that a "brief
history of transporting oil and gas by a few flag states" may be sufficient. 116 Butler takes a similar view in his study of the Northeast Arctic
Passage, favouring a broad interpretation of the functional requirement
in the case of the polar regions. He argues that not only will patterns of
world commerce affect the usage of particular straits, but in the case of
the polar regions, "the very possibility of Arctic navigation is the direct
consequence of impressive achievements in vessel design, icebreaking
methods, greater knowledge of the polar environment, weather forecasting, human fortitude, and the like."' 1 7
How should this functional criteria then be applied to the Northwest Passage? To begin with, it is useful to know how many transits of
the passage have actually occurred. From the time of the very first
transit of the Passage in 1903-6 by Amundsen until 1988, there had
been fifty-six complete transits.' 18 Of these, only twenty had been completed by non-Canadian foreign flagged vessels, thirteen of which were
American. 1 19
Relying upon the actual degree of usage of the Northwest Passage
since the first successful navigation, Pharand consistently maintains that
the Passage is not an international strait.1 20 He argues that those who
contend otherwise have confused potential use with actual use, and that
mere capacity is not what is required, but rather, actual use.121 The few
examples of crossings by foreign-flagged vessels are not considered by
Pharand to alter this assessment, especially as he points out that none
were made for commercial navigation. 12 2 Other Canadian-based commentators have also adopted a similar view.' 23 However, whether the
116. Pharand, supra note 97, at 114.
117. WILLIAM E. BUTLER, NORTHEAST ARCTIC PASSAGE 135 (1978). For a further
discussion of navigation rights in the Northeast Passage, see Erik Franckx, Non-Soviet
Shipping in the Northeast Passage, and the Legal Status of Proliv Vil'kitskogo, 151:24 POLAR
REC. 269 (1988).

118. Donat Pharand, Canada'sSovereignty over the Northwest Passage, 10 MICH.J. INT'L
L. 653, 676-78 (1989); cf. Thomas C. Pullen & Charles Swithinbank, Transits of the
Northwest Passage, 1906-1990, 27 POLAR RECORD 365-67 (1991) (noting 50 transits
during 1906-1990; though it seems that this figure did not include return journeys by
the same vessel during the same season; neither sets of figures include instances of
submarine navigation of the Passage which though strongly suspected have not been
documented).
119. Pullen & Swithinbank, supra note 118, at 365 (recording 23 transits by foreign
vessels, 15 of which were by United States flagged vessels).
120. Pharand, supra note 118, at 669-70; PHARAND, supra note 14, at 225; Pharand,
supra note 97, at 112-13.
121. PHARAND, supra note 14, at 225; Pharand, supra note 97, at 113.
122. Pharand, supra note 97, at 112-13.
123. McDorman, supra note 59, at 251, notes that "[t]he amount of known traffic
through the Northwest Passage has been insignificant." McKinnon, supra note 103,
at 816, argues that "[t]he Northwest Passage ...does not meet the second, or functional criterion since it has not been sufficiently used for international navigation."
McRae, supra note 47, at 488, argues that "[t]he lack of use of the Northwest Passage
for international shipping has prevented it from achieving the status of an international strait." See also Robert R. Roth, Sovereignty andJurisdiction over Arctic Waters, 28
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customary international law regime of Corfu Channel, or of the 1958 Convention or UNCLOS applies, one must concede that, potentially, considerable difference of opinion on this question exists. Certainly, the
amount of traffic through the Northwest Passage is not comparable to
that of the Corfu Channel, or of other commonly accepted international
straits. The need to apply different standards in the polar regions, however, has been recognized. 124 Accordingly, the presence of ice in the
Passage and the polar weather conditions, should, in combination, allow
for a test requiring a lower volume of international navigation to use the
125
Passage in order to classify it as an international strait.
Applying the functional criterion to the Northwest Passage, one is
struck by the very low number of transits that have occurred since its
discovery. Most international navigation since 1945 has been conducted
by government vessels; although no consensus exists on whether navigation by commercial vessels is essential to constitute "international navigation." The Court in Corfu Channel noted, however, how often the
British navy used the channel. 126 Accordingly, voyages by various
United States Coast Guard vessels could similarly be viewed as evidence
of international navigation through the Passage.
Whether, taking into account the Corfu Channel test, the views of
various commentators, and making allowance for polar conditions, there
has been a sufficient number of transits by ships engaged in international navigation through the Passage so as to meet the functional criterion is difficult to determine. There is evidence of increasing usage of
the Passage, with twenty-three transits-eight by non-Canadian flagged
vessels-recorded during the 1980s. 12 7 Nevertheless, without further
judicial guidance on the question of international straits, the determination of whether the Passage is or is not an international strait is
extremely difficult. Those commentators who argue that the Northwest
Passage is not an international strait rely upon an interpretation of the
Corfu Channel case which is not universally accepted. They fail to adequately take into account that, because of polar conditions, a lesser volume of navigation through the Passage may still be sufficient to classify
the strait as international.
L. REV. 845, 864 (1990); Paul A. Kettuner, The Status of the Northwest Passage
under InternationalLaw, 4 DEr. C.L. REV. 929, 979 (1990).
124. See Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Nor. v. Den.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B) No.
ALBERTA

53, at 22 (Apr. 5).
125. One commentator has even suggested that the functional criterion is "so

inexact as to [be] almost meaningless" and that "perhaps one foreign-flagged vessel
a decade would suffice" to evidence international navigation. See Lewis M. Alexander, Exceptions to the Transit PassageRegime: Straits with Routes of "Similar Convenience," 18
OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 479, 480 n.3 (1987).
126. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.CJ. 80.

127. Pharand, supra note 118, at 677-78. Pullen & Swithinbank also recorded 23
transits up until 1990, 11 by foreign-flagged vessels, five of which were United States
flagged. Pullen & Swithinbank, supra note 118.
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C. The Effect of Canada's Arctic Baselines on the Passage
Before leaving the issue of Canada's claims over the Northwest Passage
some consideration must be given to the 1986 declaration of straight
baselines around the outer limits of the islands which make up the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. This action was taken in response to the voyage of the PolarSea, and had been suggested as an effective means for
Canada to assert sovereignty over the waters of the archipelago. 128
Under the law of the sea, coastal states may, in certain instances, use a
baseline rather than the low-water mark of their coastline as the point
from which their maritime zones are delimited. Well recognized examples of this accepted practice are demonstrated by bays, river mouths
and deltas, and low-tide elevations which are adjacent to the coastline. 129 In the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, the International
Court ofJustice recognized that where the coastline of a coastal state is
deeply indented or where there is a cluster of offshore fringing islands,
baselines can be drawn in such a way that the outer points of these geographic features may be connected.' 30 Both the 1958 Geneva Convention and UNCLOS recognized this practice. Not only will the drawing of
these baselines result in the coastal state being able to exert more extensive offshore jurisdiction and sovereignty but it also has the effect of
enclosing all waters on the landward side of the baseline as "internal
waters." 1 3 1 Because of the impact that baselines have upon the outer
limits of a coastal state's maritime zones and its sovereignty over the
enclosed internal waters, both the 1958 Geneva Convention and
UNCLOS sought to guard against excessive baseline claims. In particular, UNCLOS provides in Article 7(3): "The drawing of straight baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
direction of the coast, and the sea areas lying within the lines must be
sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime
of internal waters." ' 13 2 In addition, UNCLOS recognized the concept of
an archipelagic state around which archipelagic baselines could be
drawn to connect the islands, a first in international law.13 3 Article 47
creates a series of technical rules to follow in drawing these special baselines. Importantly for Canada, the UNCLOS archipelagic regime does
128. Reid, supra note 16, at 130-33; McRae, supra note 47, at 482-89; Pharand,

supra note 48, at 330-32.
129. See UNCLOS, supra note 87, arts. 5, 7,10, 13.

130. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.CJ. 116 (Dec. 18).
131. See 1958 Geneva Convention, supra note 81, art. 5; UNCLOS, supra note 87,

art. 8.
132. Cf 1958 Geneva Convention, supra note 81, art. 4(2).
133. Indonesia and the Philippines were primarily responsible for the adoption of
the archipelagic concept at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea. The practice adopted by both states in subsequently adopting this regime is the
best example of how the archipelagic provisions of UNCLOS operate. See Mochtar
Kusumaatmadja, The Concept of the Indonesian Archipelago, 10 INDONESIAN Q. 12 (1982);
B. A. Hamzah, Indonesia's Archipelagic Regime, 8 MARINE POL'Y 30 (1984); Barbara
Kwiatkowska, The Archipelagic Regime in Practice in the Philippinesand Indonesia-Making
or Breaking InternationalLaw?, 6 INT'LJ. ESTUARINE AND COASTAL L. 1 (1991).

1993

Canadian-U.S. Northwest Passage Dispute

not apply to all geographic archipelagos, but only to "a State constituted

wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include other islands."' 13 4
The effect of this definition is to exclude geographic archipelagos which
lie offshore of a continental mainland such as the Hawaiian Islands and
the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. Canada cannot therefore rely upon
these more generous baseline rules to justify its Arctic Archipelago
baselines, but instead, must seek to support its actions on the principles
of baseline delimitation accepted in both customary international law
and the Conventions.
Considerable academic debate exists over the validity of Canada's
Arctic baselines. Professor Pharand, who had urged the Canadian Government for many years to proclaim such baselines, has thoroughly
reviewed their validity as have others. 13 5 It is not the intention of this
writer to give detailed consideration to this point. Suffice to say, that
under the rules for baseline delimitation developed in the 1958 Geneva
Convention and UNCLOS, in conjunction with the authority of the
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, Canada's claim to validity for its actions is

strong. 136 Despite the possible validity of the baseline claims, however,
navigation regimes in existence prior to the baseline proclamations still
have some standing. Both Article 5(2) of the 1958 Geneva Convention
and Article 8(2) of UNCLOS recognized the continuation of certain preexisting navigation rights following the proclamation of baselines.
Thus, when newly proclaimed baselines enclose as internal waters areas
which had not been previously considered as such, any previously
existing right of innocent passage continues to apply in those waters.
An exception to the continuation of pre-existing navigation rights
applies to certain historic waters over which a coastal state traditionally
exercised sovereignty orjurisdiction.13 7 The International Court ofJustice accorded special status to such "historic waters" in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case. The Conventions similarly recognizing this special

status.1 3 8 While some commentators occasionally argue that Canada
can justify its claim over the waters of the whole archipelago on the
basis of historic title, 139 many commentators doubt the validity of Canada's claim to such a degree that they wholly disregard it on the grounds
of legal impossibility. 140

134. Art. 46.
135. See Pharand, supra note 111, at 328-35; McKinnon, supra note 103.
136. This view has been adopted by other commentators. See Pharand, supra note
111, at 328-33; McKinnon, supra note 103, at 809-11; Mark Killas, The Legality of Canada's Claims to the Waters of the Arctic Archipelago, 19 OTrAWA L. REV. 95 (1987); cf Kettuner, supra note 123, at 986-89.
137. See I O'CONNELL, supra note 80, at 417-38.
138. 1958 Geneva Convention, supra note 81, art. 7(6); UNCLOS, supra note 87,
art. 10(6). An example of the application of historic title would be Hudson Bay. See
Nigel Bankes, The Status of Hudson Bay, 15:3 N. PERSP. 14 (1987).
139. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
140. PHARAND, supra note 14, at 125; Bankes, supra note 17, at 290; McKinnon,
supra note 103, at 800-01; Kettuner, supra note 123, at 989;'Roth, supra note 123, at
959.
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If, therefore, it is not possible to argue that the waters of the Northwest Passage are historic internal waters of Canada, what is the true
effect of the 1986 baselines? Both the 1958 Geneva Convention and
UNCLOS preserve previously existing rights of passage despite the subsequent proclamation of baselines which may convert high seas into
internal waters. Article 5(2) of the Geneva Convention provides that
rights of innocent passage under Article 16, including passage through
international straits, remain in place despite the waters' conversion to
internal waters as a result of the baselines. However, Article 35(a) of
UNCLOS expressly deals with internal waters of a strait, 14 1 clearly
implying that the provisions dealing with the new regime of transit passage through international straits still apply to situations where waters
have only become "internal" following the establishment of straight
baselines under the provisions of the Convention.
Thus, in order to determine whether the Northwest Passage is a
strait through which the right of transit passage exists, the status of the
Passage prior to the declaration of the baselines in 1986 must first be
ascertained. Various commentators have similarly recognized that if
Canada's claim that transit passage cannot be exercised through the
waters of the Archipelago is to succeed, Canada must first demonstrate
that the waters of the Northwest Passage are not and have never been
considered an international strait.1 4 2 The waters of the Canadian Arctic
Archipelago may therefore be properly classified as internal waters. If a
pre-existing right of navigation did exist through the strait, however,
then United States flagged vessels are still entitled to claim a right of
passage through the Northwest Passage.

M.

Antarctic Sovereignty and the Arctic
Despite Canada's best efforts, it has been unable to conclusively assert
its sovereignty over the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago and,
in particular, the Northwest Passage, resulting in a continuing dispute
with the United States. This dispute, however, does not relate to Canadian sovereignty over the islands of the archipelago, or even to Canada's
privilege to assert sovereignty over some of the Passage waters as the
relevant littoral state. Rather, the dispute concerns the extent of Canadian jurisdiction and whether the Passage can truly be classified as an
international strait. For Canadians, every transit by a United States flagged vessel through the Passage is considered a threat to Canadian sovereignty. For Americans, Canada's refusal to acknowledge that the
Passage is an international strait impacts upon the freedom of naviga141. UNCLOS, supra note 87, art. 35(a), provides: "Nothing in this Part affects:

(a) any areas of internal waters within a strait, except where the establishment of a
straight baseline in accordance with the method set forth in article 7 has the effect of
enclosing as internal waters areas which had not previously been considered as such
142. Pharand, supra note 111, at 335-42; McKinnon, supra note 103, at 816-17;
Kettuner, supra note 123, at 982.
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tion. Given this impasse, the question arises whether there is any potential solution to this problem. As the Antarctic Treaty has been
particularly successful in dealing with questions of sovereignty, some
consideration should be given to whether that portion of the Treaty
expressly dealing with sovereignty could be applied in the Northwest
Passage to overcome the current deadlock between Canada and the
United States.
A. The Antarctic Experience
Despite centuries-old belief in its existence, the Antarctic remained an
unexplored frontier until the Nineteenth century. It was not until the
1820s that the continent's existence was actually confirmed when three
explorers, Branfield (Britain), Palmer (United States) and Bellingshausen (Russia), all individually sighted the continent. 143 Despite its
discovery, however, explorers showed little real interest in Antarctica
until the beginning 1of
the Twentieth Century when explorers began a
"race for the Pole." 44 It was only at this stage of Antarctica's modem
history that assertions of territorial sovereignty became an issue. Suddenly, in the span of forty years, seven territorial claims were made to
the Antarctic continent, forming the basis of the modem territorial
claims to Antarctica.145

The United Kingdom's claim dates from acts of discovery by various
explorers and proclamations of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands
and South Georgia.14 6 British claims and discoveries eventually formed
the basis for claims made by New Zealand and Australia. Encouraged by
the United Kingdom to assert sovereignty over the continent, and
enthused by the success of their own expeditioners in Antarctic exploration, Australia and New Zealand made extensive sovereignty claims to
Antarctica in the years following World War 1.147 The Ross Dependency was declared as part of the then Dominion of New Zealand on July
30, 1923,148 and the Australian Antarctic Territory as part of an Austra143. F. M.

AUBURN, ANTARCTIC LAW AND POLITICS

2 (1982).

144. "Race for the Pole" was a phrase commonly used in the early Twentieth Century by the media to describe expeditions to both the Arctic and Antarctic which had
the objective of being the first to reach the geographic North and South Poles.

145. The first positive assertion of a territorial claim in Antarctica were the Letters
Patent issued by Great Britain in 1908. See Letters Patent for the Government of the
Falkland (Malvinas) Island Dependencies, July 21, 1908, reprinted in 3 W. M. BUSH,
ANTARCTICA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 25-54 (1988). Further claims by Great Britain
and the other six territorial claimants were made up until 1947 when Argentina made
an expanded claim. See 1 W. M. BUSH, ANTARCTICA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 624-31

(1982).
146. See C. H. M. Waldock, Disputed Sovereignty in the FalklandIslands, 25 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 311 (1948); AUBURN, supra note 143, at 6-7.

147. See

GILLIAN TRIGGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AUSTRALIAN SOVEREIGNTY IN

ANTARCTICA 102-11 (1986); F. M. AUBURN, THE Ross DEPENDENCY (1972).
148. New Zealand, Gazette, 1923, vol. II, at 2211 (16 August 1923), reprinted in 3
BUSH, supra note 145, at 44; see also AUBURN, supra note 147.

Cornell InternationalLaw Journal

Vol 26

lian claim during 1933.149 In addition, the French, who also had a historic interest in Antarctica following the voyage of Durville in 1840,
claimed the area known as Adelie Land in 1933. This claim lay between
the two sectors which had been subject to the Australian proclamation
earlier in the year. There was some uncertainty, however, as to the exact
extent of the French claim; and correspondence between France and
Britain (representing Australia at the time) continued until 1938 before
the exact limits of the claim were settled. 1 50 Norway, whose Ronald
Amundsen had been the first explorer to reach the South Pole, 15 1 also
began to assert various Antarctic claims from 1928 onwards. 152 These
claims, though, were limited to offshore islands. 153 When Germany also
began to show an interest in the area during the 1930s, Norway took
action to confirm its claim to the continent, issuing a proclamation on
January 14, 1939, over what is now known as Dronning Maud Land. 154
The final territorial claims to Antarctica were made by Chile and Argentina during the 1940s. These claims overlap each other and also that
made by the United Kingdom over the Antarctic Peninsula area. Chile's
proclamation came in November 1940,155 with Argentina following in
1941.156 The claims made by the two South American neighbours are
notable because they partly rely upon the Papal Bulls of 1493 which
declared the former boundaries of the Spanish colonies, 157 and because
they impact upon their own territorial dispute over Tierra Del Fuego
and the Beagle Channel, 15 8 and the dispute between Argentina and the
159
United Kingdom over the Falkland Islands.
Despite the various sovereignty claims to Antarctica during this
time, few countries expressed interest in the continent. Antarctica was
viewed as a frozen wasteland with no foreseeable economic potential
and no immediate strategic significance. There were no people to colonize and no immediate resource potential to realize. With respect to
acquiring territorial rights in international law, Antarctica was treated in
the same way as other discovered and settled lands. Occasional concern
149. See Australian Antarctic Territory Acceptance Act 1933 (Aust.); A. C. Castles,
The InternationalStatus ofthe AustralianAntarctic Territory, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AusTRALIA (D. P. O'Connell ed., 1965); TRIGGS, supra note 147, at 1-96.
150. J. R. V. Prescott, Boundaries in Antarctica, in AuSTRALIA's ANTARCTIC POLICY
OPTIONS 83, 87-89 (Stuart Harris ed., 1984).

151. Amundsen was also the first to actually sail through the Northwest Passage in
1903-1906.
152. See AUBURN, supra note 143, at 29-30.
153. 2 W. M. BUSH, ANTARCTICA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 114-24 (1982).

154. Norwegian Sovereignty in Antarctica: Proclamationof 14 January 1939, reprinted in
34 AM.J. INT'L L. Supp. 83 (1940).
155. See 2 Bush, supra note 153, at 311.
156. 1 BUSH, supra note 145, at 608. The Argentine claim was subsequently
adjusted in 1943, 1946 and 1957. See Prescott, supra note 150, at 91.
157. The Papal Bulls of 1493 declared the former boundaries of the Spanish colonies. AUBURN, supra note 143, at 49-50.
158. See D.W. Grieg, The Beagle Channel Arbitration, 7 AusTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 332
(1976-1977).

159. See Waldock, supra note 146.
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was expressed about the potential for sovereignty disputes to develop
between the claimant states or with third parties. 160 Apart from an
aborted claim before the International Court of Justice by the United
Kingdom to resolve its conflicting claims with Argentina and Chile, how1 61
ever, nothing came of this concern.
The deepening of the Cold War during the 1950s, however, did
become a catalyst for concern over Antarctic territorial claims. Both the
United States and the Soviet Union had a long historical interest in Antarctica, yet neither sought to assert a formal claim. 162 American explorers and sealers were very active in the region during the nineteenth
century, but no attempt was made at sending an "official" American
expedition to the continent during the period from 1900-1920 when
expeditions to Antarctica were numerous. 163 Consequently, when other
nations initially asserted territorial claims to the Antarctic, the United
States was not in a position to contest those claims. The United States
did, however, begin to have a more substantial presence on the continent during the 1930s, and became especially active during the 1950s
when scientific interest in Antarctica heightened. 1 4 United States influence in Antarctic affairs reached its peak during the 1957-58 International Geophysical Year when American scientists, with infrastructure
assistance from the United States military, played a dominant role in the
1 65
scientific program.
The Soviet Union also had an Antarctic heritage, with the Russian
explorer, Bellingshausen, being one of the first to sight the continent in
1821. The Soviets established a number of scientific bases in Antarctica
during the 1950s, many of which were located within the Australian
Antarctic Territory. 16 6 The substantial presence of the United States
and the U.S.S.R. in Antarctica during this time raised concerns about
the future of existing territorial claims if either of the superpowers made
a conflicting claim, 16 7 and the potential for the continent to become the
scene of Cold War tensions over territorial claims and strategic scientific
research. These were some of the factors which lead to the 1959
Antarctic Treaty.
160. See Philip C.Jessup, Sovereignty in Antarctica, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 117, 117-19
(1947); see also 2 BUSH, supra note 153, at 187-88, with respect to Australian concern
over the establishment of a Soviet base within the Australian Antarctic Territory during the 1950s.
161. Application Instituting Proceedings Against the Argentine Republic (U.K. v.

Arg.; U.K. v. Chile), 1956 I.C.J. Pleadings (Antarctica Cases) 12 (May 1955).
162. AUBURN, supra note 143, at 61-83.
163. AUBURN, supra note 143, at 62.
164. AUBURN, supra note 143, at 62-63.
165. AUBURN, supra note 143, at 87-89.
166. John Hanessian, Jr., Antarctica: Current National Interests and Legal Realities,
PROC. OF THE AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L L., Apr. 24-26, 1958, at 145, 157-58.
167. Robert D. Hayton, The Antarctic Settlement of 1959, 54 AM.J. INT'L L. 349, 353
(1960).
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The Antarctic Sovereignty Solution

The International Geophysical Year in Antarctica demonstrated the
importance of the continent to scientific research. The successful cooperation between the twelve participating nations encouraged those who
believed that a regime could be negotiated which would both ensure
continued scientific cooperation amongst nations in Antarctica and solve
the emerging political problems.' 6 8 Accordingly, the United States
invited participants to a Conference in Washington, D.C. in October
1959.169 The Conference concluded with the signing of the Antarctic
Treaty on December 1, 1959.170 The Treaty was eventually ratified by
all of the twelve states which attended the Conference - Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South
Africa, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
The Antarctic Treaty addressed all the major issues confronting
Antarctica at that time. Article I provided that the continent was to be
used for peaceful purposes only, and in combination with Article V,
ensured that Antarctica was to be both demilitarized and denuclearized.
Articles II and III sought to guarantee the scientific freedom of the
International Geophysical Year. In addition, Article IX provides for
Antarctic Treaty meetings to allow Treaty parties to discuss matters of
mutual interest and address emerging environmental issues. These provisions sought to capture the spirit of cooperation which had grown in
Antarctica during the 1950s. But for the Treaty to truly succeed, it had
to consider the issue of sovereignty, to which a most inventive solution
was adopted.
Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty deals with sovereignty. It provides as follows:
Article IV
1. Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as:
(a) A renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted
rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica;
(b) A renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any
basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it
may have whether as a result of its activities or those of its
nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise;
(c) Prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its
recognition or non-recognition of any other State's right of or
claim or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.
2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force
shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty
in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force.
168. TRIGGS, supra note 147, at 133-36.
169. 3 BUSH, supra note 145, at 473-75.
170. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 (entered into
force June 23, 1961). There are presently 41 parties to the Treaty.
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Article IV(l) considers the seven existing territorial claims, the
potential claims of the United States and U.S.S.R., and the consequences of these claimant and non-claimant states entering into a multilateral Treaty that impacts upon Antarctic sovereignty. Under this
provision, all principal parties to the Treaty can unite under the control
of a single regime without compromising their position on their sovereignty, or potential sovereignty claims. Sub-paragraph (a) considers the
seven claimants, while sub-paragraph (b) accommodates the United
States and U.S.S.R. 17 1 Sub-paragraph (c) addresses the non-recognition of existing claims amongst some of the claimants and between
1 72
claimants and non-claimants.
Because the Treaty covers pre-existing territorial claims, Article
IV(2) expressly focuses on any issues of sovereignty which could arise
after the Treaty entered into force. The Article provides that no new
territorial claim, not even the enlargement of an existing claim, can be
asserted while the Treaty is in force. This is an attempt to maintain the
status quo for the duration of the Treaty such that Treaty parties, especially the seven claimant states, do not continually suspect other Treaty
parties of planning to encroach upon their claims in the future. In addition, acts and activities which take place while the Treaty is in force cannot form the basis for any future assertions of sovereignty. The
consequence of all this is that the Treaty effectively froze the status of all
sovereignty claims and potential claims as of June 23, 1961.
Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty has rightly been described as the
"cornerstone of the Antarctic Treaty." 17 3 As the New Zealand diplomat, Chris Beeby, noted, Article IV "represented, and it still represents,
an assurance-and the only assurance available-that Antarctica will
remain peaceful and stable, will not become, in the words of the Treaty,
'the scene or object of international discord.' "174 The significance of
Article IV to the Treaty regime is demonstrated by its continual reaffirmation in later instruments which have expanded the regime to address
protection of the environment and resource management.1 7 5 Despite
the obvious and continuing importance of Article IV, its true legal effect
has provoked considerable debate. One commentator asserts that Arti171. Donald R. Rothwell, The Antarctic Treaty: 1961-1991 and Beyond, 14
REV. 62, 67-68 (1992).
172. 1 BUSH, supra note 145, at 58.

SYDNEY

L.

173. Rolph Trolle-Anderson, The Antarctic Scene: Legal and Political Facts, in THE
57, 59 (Gillian D.
Triggs ed., 1987).
174. Christopher D. Beeby, The Antarctic Treaty System as a Resource Management
Mechanism-Non-Living Resources, in ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM 269, 270 (1986).
175. See Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, June 1, 1972, art. 1,
29 U.S.T. 441, T.I.A.S. No. 8,826 (entered into force Mar. 11, 1978); Convention for
the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, May 20, 1980, art. IV, 80
Stat. 271, T.I.A.S. No. 10,240 (entered into force on April 7, 1982) [hereinafter
ANTARCTIC TREATY REGIME: LAW, ENVIRONMENT AND RESOURCES

CCAMLR].

Cornell InternationalLaw Journal

Vol. 26

cle IV(l) can "mean all things to all states," 176 while another argues that
the provision was "deliberately drafted to enable States with conflicting
interests to adopt differing views as to its meaning."' 17 7 There is certainly no question that parts of Article IV are extremely vague and do
not adequately address all the potential legal issues which could
78
arise. '
Whatever its true legal effect may be, Article IV has allowed the
Antarctic Treaty to successfully function for the past thirty years without
any sovereignty disputes arising between any of the parties. Given that
at the time of its negotiation there was considerable discussion about the
status, validity and extent of the territorial claims in Antarctica, this has
been a remarkable achievement. That the Treaty was able to hold firm
in spite of a military dispute concerning territorial sovereignty between
Argentina and the U.K. over the Falkland Islands is further evidence of
its success in dealing with Antarctic sovereignty. The Treaty parties'
resolution of both living and non-living resource exploitation in the
1980s is further evidence of Article IV's ability to be effective in the face
of a potential challenge to sovereignty. In both instances, reliance upon
Article IV allowed for the successful negotiation of conventions to deal
with the exploitation and management of resources over which territorial claimants in normal circumstances would have had sovereign

rights. 179
Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty is therefore a combination of
"legal fiction" and political compromise. Concerned treaty parties knew
in 1959 that if any Antarctic regime was based on territorial claims, considerable dispute would arise over the validity of those claims. This controversy would not have been in any State's best interests. Under the
Article IV approach, sovereignty questions could be set aside for the
duration of the Treaty to allow further cooperation on scientific research
and the peaceful use of Antarctica. Given its success, the question arises
whether an Article IV-type solution can be used in the Arctic.
IV.

A Northwest Passage Treaty?

Since the voyages of the Manhattan in 1969-1970, Canada has sought to
solidify its sovereignty claim to the Arctic Archipelago. If there were any
doubts as to Canada's intention to assert a claim over the islands of the
Archipelago at the time of the Manhattan voyage, Canada's subsequent
176. Gillian Triggs, The Antarctic Treaty Regime: A Workable Compromise or a "Purgatory
ofAmbiguity"?, 17 CASE W. REs.J. INT'L L. 195, 210 (1985).
177. AUBURN, supra note 143, at 104.
178. Some of these issues include whether a non-claimant state is precluded from
asserting a territorial claim which relies upon activities occurring while the Treaty

was in force after the Treaty is no longer operative, and what effect Article IV has
upon non-Treaty parties. See TRIGcs, supra note 147, at 140-50.
179. CCAMLR, supra note 175, art. IV; Convention for the Regulation of Antarctic

Mineral Resource Activities, June 2, 1988, art. 9, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 868 (1988) (the
Convention has yet to enter into force).
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legislative acts and government decrees have conclusively dispelled
them. Asserting sovereignty over land, however, is different from
asserting sovereignty over water and maritime areas because of specialized rules under the law of the sea. There can be no doubt that following the International Court ofJustice decision in the Corfu Channel case,
and subsequent recognition in the 1958 Geneva Convention and then
UNCLOS, that international law has recognized a special regime for
international straits. Throughout this period, the consensus has been
that both a geographical and functional requirement must be met if a
strait is to be classified as international. The regime of transit passage in
international straits created by UNCLOS is a much more recent development in international law, and because of the uncertain status of the
Convention it is doubtful whether it can be said to represent customary
international law.18 0 Yet, irrespective of the exact state of the law and
the position of Canada and the United States with respect to the various
Conventions, the Northwest Passage debate hinges on whether the Passage is an international strait.
The Canadian position with respect to the Passage can be summarized as follows:
1) the Northwest Passage has never been a strait used for international
navigation;
2) the waters of the Northwest Passage are internal waters of Canada
because:
a) they are historic waters; or alternatively,
b) they have become internal waters following Canada's declaration
of baselines around the edges of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago; and,
3) coastal states have complete sovereignty over internal waters and can
regulate or prohibit passage by international vessels as they see fit.
While the Canadian position has certain strengths, absent judicial determination, the question still remains whether the Northwest Passage is an
international strait and, if so, at what point it became such. This question is at the hub of the dispute between Canada and the United States
and has been at issue ever since the voyage of the Manhattan. Given the
strong views of the United States on freedom of navigation through the
territorial sea, straits, and archipelagoes, it is understandable that it
refuses to accept the Canadian position. 18 1 This is especially so given
that the Northwest Passage has the potential of becoming economically
viable for commercial transit as new technology allows navigation
through ice clogged waters by a greater range of shipping on a more
180. On the question of whether non-parties to UNCLOS may claim a right of
transit passage, see Gerard J. Mangone, Demarcation of InternationalStraits, in RIGHTS
TO OCEANIC RESOURCES: DECIDING AND DRAWING MARITIME BOUNDARIES

101, 110-11

(Dorinda G. Dallmeyer & Louis DeVorsey, Jr. eds., 1989).
181. See, e.g., Richard J. Grunawalt, United States Policy on International Straits, 18
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 445 (1987).
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regular seasonal basis. 18 2
Given the divergent views of Canada and the United States over the
legal status of the Northwest Passage, what possibilities exist to resolve
the dispute? One option would be to have the matter referred to the
International Court ofJustice. Not all states, however, are keen to have
their disputes adjudicated in such a legalistic fashion, or to allow them
to inevitably become a battle of national prestige. Both Canada and the
United States dissatisfaction after the decision in the Gulf of Maine
case' 83 also suggests that resolution of the dispute by the International
Court is unlikely to be a preferred option. Given the history of cooperation between these two neighbours, a more preferable resolution might
be through negotiation of an agreement or Treaty similar to the 1988
4
Arctic Cooperation Agreement.' 8
The Canada-United States Northwest Passage dispute appears to be
ready-made for the application of an Article IV Antarctic Treaty-type
solution. Canada and the United States contest the extent of Canada's
sovereignty and jurisdictional reach over the waters of the passage.
Should Canada's claim that the waters are internal Canadian waters be
accepted, then an automatic right of passage would not exist for foreign
flagged vessels. The United States does not contest Canada's ability as
the littoral state to exert some form of sovereignty and jurisdiction over
the waters of the passage. Rather, the United States asserts that its vessels are entitled to exercise normal freedoms of navigation through the
waters of the Passage. The claim does not extend any further. There
has never been any suggestion, despite speculative claims by the Canadian media,' 8 5 that the United States is threatening Canadian sovereignty over the islands of the archipelago, or that it is contesting
Canada's resource jurisdiction over the waters and seabed of the Archipelago. Instead, the United States claims that, like other coastal states
which border international straits, Canada is under an obligation to
allow transit passage of the waters of the strait subject to Canadian laws
and regulations which implement internationally recognized standards
under international law.
Applying an Article IV Antarctic Treaty-type solution to this problem would allow the sovereignty issue to be resolved in favour of the
existing sovereign, Canada, while permitting international navigation in
the Passage without affecting the status of that sovereign. By implementing this device, nothing prevents Canada and the United States
from reaching agreement on a "Northwest Passage Treaty." This
Treaty would specifically include an Article IV Antarctic Treaty-type
clause which would recognize the existing positions of Canada and the
182.
47.
183.
U.S.),
184.
185.

See Stephen Hazell, The Icetanher Cometh,

ARCTIC CIRCLE,

July/Aug. 1990, at

Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v.
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United States towards the Passage and would maintain the status quo.
The Treaty could then specifically provide for navigation through the
Passage based upon an UNCLOS transit passage regime through international straits.
Such a Treaty would effectively allow Canada's pre-existing sover186
Any
eignty claim over the waters of the Passage to remain intact.
throughplace
took
which
activities of the United States or its nationals
out the duration of the Treaty would not impact at all upon the status of
Canada's pre-existing, present or future sovereignty over the Passage.
By entering into such a Treaty, neither Canada or the United States
actions would prejudice their previous positions, or be viewed as a recognition of the validity of each other's differing claim. The United
States and its flagged vessels would be able to use the waters of the
Northwest Passage without permission from Canada, thereby overcoming any impression that the United States acknowledges the Canadian
claim. The only limitation upon United States vessels would be an obligation to respect Canadian laws and regulations dealing with transit passage as recognized by UNCLOS.
By incorporating into the Treaty the express transit passage provisions of UNCLOS, Canada as the coastal state could rely upon the provisions of Article 42 to implement various laws and regulations
concerning the conduct of transit passage by foreign flagged vessels.
Though such coastal state regulation must not have the practical effect
of hampering or denying the right of transit passage, there is provision
for the implementation of laws and regulations which adopt applicable
18 7
Given
international regulations addressing the control of pollution.
Canada's long-expressed concern with the protection of the Arctic
marine environment, it may well be the case that it would not consider
existing international standards to be appropriate for the Arctic waters.
In this situation, Canada would have strong grounds in negotiating with
the United States that the provisions of Article 234 of UNCLOS apply in
this instance. Article 234 provides:
Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory
laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine
pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the
presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine
environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the
ecological balance. Such laws and regulations shall have due regard to
186. In addition, by incorporating the provisions of UNCLOS addressing transit

passage into such a Treaty, Canada would also have the benefit of UNCLOS, supra
note 87, art. 34, which provides that the regime of transit passage does not "affect
the legal status of the waters forming such straits or the exercise by the States bordering the straits of their sovereignty or jurisdiction over such waters and their air space,

bed and subsoil." See V. D. Bordunov, The Right of Transit Passageunder the 1982 Convention, 12 MARINE POL'Y 219, 223-24 (1988).
187. UNCLOS, supra note 87, art. 42(l)(b).
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navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine environment based on the best available scientific advice.
It is commonly accepted that Canada was primarily responsible for the
adoption of Article 234.188 By relying upon this Article Canada would
have the ability to implement wide ranging marine pollution regulations
upon ships engaged in transit passage. Canada's position would be further strengthened by the fact that Article 233, which exempts international straits from the application of certain sections of UNCLOS
addressing protection of the marine environment, does not extend to
Article 234. Therefore, by relying upon the terms of UNCLOS as the
basis for the agreed navigation regime through the Passage, Canada
could, under the terms of any negotiated Treaty, justifiably adopt more
stringent pollution standards than those which would apply to international straits in more temperate climates.
By negotiating a Treaty based upon these terms Canada and the
United States would go a long way towards solving their dispute over
the Northwest Passage. Canada could be content in the knowledge that
a workable solution to sovereignty had been used which would not
threaten its current claim over the waters of the archipelago. The
UNCLOS transit passage regime, in conjunction with Article 234, would
also provide Canada with ample jurisdiction to enforce stringent pollution standards commensurate with the pollution risks that exist in Arctic
waters. For the United States, such a Treaty would ensure guaranteed
freedom of navigation which could not be suspended.1 8 9 Commercial
shipping of the Passage could accordingly be developed without fear
that every transit would be considered a threat to Canadian national
security and sovereignty.
Conclusion
The Arctic is undergoing fundamental change. Once considered a
region dominated by individual territorial claimants and disparate legal
regimes, the negotiation of UNCLOS was seen as a catalyst for a new
Arctic regime based on the law of the sea. 190 Moreover, during the last
188. See BARBARA KwIATKowsKA, THE 200 MILE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE IN THE
NEW LAW OF THE SEA 176-77 (1989); for a comment on the full extent of Article 234,
see D. M. McRae & D. J. Goundrey, EnvironmentalJurisdiction in Arctic Waters: The
Extent of Article 234, 16 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 197 (1982).
189. UNCLOS, supra note 87, art. 44, provides for the non-suspension of transit
passage through an international strait.
190. For suggestions concerning Arctic ocean management and an Arctic law of
the sea regime, see B. J. THEUTENBERG, THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW OF THE SEA: A
STUDY OF RESOURCES AND STRATEGY WITH SPECIAL REGARD TO THE POLAR REGIONS

(1984); David L. Vanderzwaag & Cynthia Lamson, Ocean Development and Management
in the Arctic: Issues in American and Canadian Relations, 39 ARCTIC 327 (1986); Cynthia
Lamson & David L. Vanderzwaag, Arctic Waters: Needs and Optionsfor Canadian-American Cooperation, 18 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 49 (1987); David L. Vanderzwaag et al.,
Towards Regional Ocean Management in the Arctic: From Co-existence to Cooperation, 37
U.N.B. LJ. 1 (1988).
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twenty years, the native peoples of the region have played an important
role in educating the Arctic rim nations of their presence and concern
for the protection of their heritage and environment. Some of these
developments have already borne fruit as is evidenced by the 1991
Rovaniemi Agreement. Canada has also called for the creation of an
"International Arctic Council" from amongst the Arctic nations in order
to enhance international cooperative efforts within the region. 19 1 These
developments demonstrate the increasing inter-relationship which exists
amongst the Arctic nations and the growing momentum for greater Arctic cooperation.
The dispute between Canada and the United States over the Northwest Passage exists against this backdrop. Given that the dispute has
continued for over twenty years and has involved fundamental issues of
territorial sovereignty and national security, resolution will not be simple. UNCLOS does partially succeed in furthering Canada's claim to
enforce special pollution regulations over vessels using its Arctic waters.
The 1988 Arctic Cooperation Agreement also resolves one area of disagreement, but by sidestepping the much larger question of commercial
navigation of the Passage, the major issue of the dispute still simmers.
Under these circumstances, it seems appropriate to consider whether
solutions to other territorial and sovereignty problems may be
applicable.
The "solution" to the problem of disputed sovereignty in the
Antarctic allowed the seven territorial claimants to come together with
other interested states in a Treaty which sought to benefit all mankind.
This was despite the fact that many of the claimant states possessed a
proud polar heritage in which their Antarctic claims were an integral
part of their national identity. The Antarctic Treaty was, however, based
on the underlying assumption that Antarctica was too scientifically
important to be a continual scene of sovereignty disputes. Instead, it
should be opened to all mankind as the world's largest scientific
laboratory.
Similarities exist between Antarctica and the current situation in the
Northwest Passage. A sovereignty dispute stands in the way of further
international cooperation between two Arctic states which have a long
history of being good neighbours. If the sovereignty question can be
resolved, then it is more than likely that an agreement can be reached
over the future use of the Northwest Passage. In these circumstances, it
seems appropriate that an effort be made to use an Article IV Antarctic
Treaty-type solution to solve the impasse which exists over the Northwest Passage. A Treaty relying upon this device, however, would not
completely resolve the dispute. Negotiation must take place to decide if
a Treaty would adopt certain provisions of UNCLOS concerning transits
191. See A Clean Arctic, TORONTO STAR, June 17, 1991, at A20; John Cruickshank,
Diplomacy among the Ice Floes, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Oct. 11, 1991, at A19. For
further background, see Arctic Council: Canada Preparesfor a New Era in Circumpolar
Relations, 19 N. PERSP. 1 (1991).
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through the Passage. If an Article IV/UNCLOS based Treaty was
agreed upon, many of the problems concerning the use of the Passage
might be resolved. This is not to imply that a complete Antarctic
Treaty-type solution can be employed in the case of the Northwest Passage or the Arctic generally. 1 9 2 Rather, techniques used to resolve some
international legal and political problems may be used as a precedent
for resolving similar problems elsewhere. By adopting such a bipolar
approach to the resolution of the Northwest Passage dispute and incorporating provisions of UNCLOS into the settlement, Canada and the
United States would go a long way in resolving their differences on this
matter and promote further bilateral and multilateral Arctic
cooperation.

192. See 0. S. Stokke, The Relevance of the Antarctic Treaty System as a Model for International Cooperation, in THE ANTARcTIc TREATY SYSTEM IN WORLD POLITICS 357, 360-61
(A. Jorgensen-Dahl & W. Ostreng eds., 1991); cf YOUNG, supra note 3, at 166, 182.

